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Abstract
The United States and Canada have developed very different grain handling and transportation
systems (GHTSs) over the last several decades to compete for global and domestic markets in Canada
and the United States under CUSTA. Because the grain industries in both countries face long distance
hauls, GHTSs are critically important to their operations and to producer returns.
There has been considerable pressure for change in Canada’s grain handling and transportation
sector. Some industry trends, such as the rationalization of elevators in the Prairies and investments in
new high through-put facilities, are being driven by market and competitive forces. Changes in grain
handling, reciprocal access to marketing functions, and elimination of rate caps may have a significant
impact on cross-border grain flows.
Canadian Transport announced reforms to improve the efficiency of its GHTS. Possible multi-
level effects, created by the reform package, would affect the grain flow from Canada to the United
States. The most significant reforms include ‘port buying’ by the Canadian Wheat Board, which would
remove the Board’s control over internal logistics and shipping, and replacement of the current
maximum railway rate scale with a cap on annual railway revenues for grain shipments.
Key Words: Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), Grain Trade, Grain Transportation and Handling
System (GHTS), Rail Rate, Railcar Allocation, Rationalization, Rate Cap, Reciprocal
Access, Regulation, Reform Package.vi
Highlights
Grain handling and transportation systems (GHTSs) are among the important issues of the
agricultural agenda in the Unites States - Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). The two countries
have developed very different GHTSs over the last several decades. In the United States, price signals
and service competition throughout the system coordinate the vertical marketing functions and guide
marketing and investment decisions.  In Canada, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) has controlled the
GHTS to regulate a single marketing and transportation system to support the CWB’s export marketing
monopoly. The CWB and other government agents in the industry allocate the key physical system
resources such as grain deliveries, storage capacity, and railway cars. The Canadian GHTS is an
administered system in which market price signals have been less effective and competitive pressures
do not exist due to regulatory and administrative controls. 
Recently the GHTSs in the two countries have rapidly developed to compete for global and
domestic markets in Canada and the United States under CUSTA. It is important to compare the
structure, regulatory practices, reforms, and efficiency of both GHTSs because they directly affect the
competitive position of grain producers in each country; grain producers are highly dependent on rail
transportation to move grains long distances to export ports. Under CUSTA, there is growing pressure
to harmonize the GHTS and diversify delivery options.
The U.S. GHTS has experienced extensive deregulation with many marketing and
transportation options and has evolved toward a commercial model within a competitive environment
since the 1980s. As a result, investment, new technologies, and deregulation have brought substantial
increases in the volume of grains shipped and decreases in railway freight rates. The Canadian GHTS is
undergoing substantial changes based on the Estey Report and the Kroeger Report. On May 10, 2000,
Canadian Transport announced the government’s intention to introduce measures to increase efficiency
and cut costs in Canada’s GHTS. The reforms began on August 1, 2000.
Because the grain industries in both countries face long distance hauls, GHTSs are critically
important to their operations and to producer returns. The Canadian and U.S. GHTSs are based on
very different regulatory structures. In Canada, reforms have been implemented to increase efficiency
and cut costs in their GHTS. In the United States, farmers and grain handlers are searching for higher
grain prices, lower operating costs, and access of U.S. grains to Canadian markets.
The Canadian rail system is dominated by two rail carriers: the Canadian National (CN) and
Canadian Pacific (CP). Both carriers have major lines with an east-west configuration, which facilites
shipments of grain from Prairie locations to Pacific ports or the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway.
CP, which has ownership of the former Soo Line, has lines through North Dakota, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin, giving it direct access to major U.S. consumption points for malting barley and wheat. CN,
which owns the former Illinois Central, moves western Canadian and U.S. grain to ports on the Gulf of
Mexico and to major U.S. consumption points. vii
The Canadian agricultural industry is heavily dependent on reliable rail service to compete in
world markets. For grains, the long distances from the Prairies to major export ports and the bulky
nature of the products give rail an inherent advantage over trucking. Although the average length of haul
and rates for Canadian grain movement have decreased due to abandonment of branch lines during the
last several years, the average length of haul and rate are still significant factors. Based on Canada’s
current infrastructure, approximately 85 percent of grain delivery points are within 50 miles of a
competing railway.  It suggests that trucking premiums and a large scale trucking program could be
implemented to move grain between CN and CP and even to the main east-west Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe (BNSF) line, which lies just south of the U.S. border. Large grain companies have the
ability to truck between competing railways. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
allows grain shipments from domestic to a transborder pattern.
The Canadian logistics system strives to operate on a ‘just-in-time’ basis. This system requires
close cooperation among buyers, suppliers, and transportation providers; reliable rail service; efficient
stock management at port terminals; and timely vessel arrivals. The smooth interaction of these factors
is critical, but the current system for moving grain in western Canada is not designed to be efficient or
customer focused. On May 10, 2000, Canadian Transport announced the government’s intention to
introduce measures to increase efficiency and cut costs in Canada’s GHTS. The reform package
contains six main components:
1. Replacement of the current maximum railway rate scale with a cap on annual railway
revenues from grain;
2.  Funding for Prairie grain roads;
3.  Creation of a more commercial and competitive system for moving grain from country
elevators to ports, which will be achieved through the expansion of tendering for CWB
shipments to port;
4. Improvements to the Final Offer Arbitration (FOA) provisions of the Canada
Transportation Act;
5. Improvements to the branch line rationalization process; and
6. Continuous monitoring and reporting by an independent private-sector third party to assess
the impact of these changes. 
Reciprocal access is the issue developed recently under the December 1998 Record of
Understanding with Canada. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) simplified handling
requirements for U.S. grain by accepting a certificate of origin instead of a Phytosanitary Certificate
(with declarations for freedom from dwarf bunt, flag smut, and Karnal bunt) for grain that meets all of
the following conditions:viii
• the grain originates in U.S. approved areas (Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota);
• the grain will transit through Canada only by rail (in sealed hopper car);
• the grain will return to the United States; and
• the grain will not be unloaded in Canada.
Under the program, U.S. producers and shippers have better transportation access to final
West Coast destinations in the United States. According to state officials, in-transit certificates have
been issued for the movement of more than 1,580 million pounds and 1,420 million pounds of grain in
1999 and 2000, respectively. However, U.S. producers and exporters would like to have access to
grain export facilities in the West Coast, mainly the port of Vancouver, under the same in-transit
program.
In North Dakota, there are no large differences in rail rates from North Dakota to West Coast
destinations between BNSF and CP (the former Soo Line Railroad). The elevator managers on the
BNSF and CP lines use the in-transit program because of availability of railcars. The freight rate is
consistent across the state for west bound shipments on both railroads but differs for east bound
shipments. Elevators in the western and northern parts of the state ship more of their grain to West
Coast destination than elevators in the east or southern parts of the state. Most elevators do not have
access to both railroads so their choice of railroad is largely determined by their location rather than
freight rates.
Access to Canadian primary elevators is vital for U.S. producers seeking to enhance
opportunities for grain sales to Canada. The Canadian Wheat Access Facilitation Program (WAFP)
improves access for U.S. grain producers and other sellers to Canada. Wheat producers from
approved areas in Montana and North Dakota or grain handlers of wheat produced in those areas
could benefit from WAFP. A producer selling wheat directly to a Canadian elevator needs to obtain a
phytosanitary certificate. Prospective U.S. wheat producers or other sellers negotiate sales contracts
with Canadian buyers covering price, quantity, quality, delivery, currency of payment, and other terms. 
Before admitting the wheat into Canada, Canadian Customs officers will verify the following documents:
 
• Canada Customs Form B3 for the identification of goods being imported;
• a Canada Customs or commercial invoice form;
• a Cargo Control Document or manifest in a format acceptable to Canada Customs;
• the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) Importer Declaration; and
• a copy of a USDA phytosanitary certificate.
In addition to these required documents, there are more complicated and cumbersome requirements in
the “Memorandum to the Canadian Trade Licensed Primary Elevators Handling U.S. Wheat.” Under
the program started in 1999, no wheat has moved from the United States to Canada. To begin wheat
export from the United States to Canada, it seems necessary to remove some of the CGC
requirements. ix
Canadian Transport announced the reforms based on both the Estey and Kroeger Reports.
Possible multi-level effects, created by the reform package, would affect the grain flow from Canada to
the United States. The most significant reform is ‘port buying’ by the CWB. Port buying would remove
the Board’s control over internal logistics and shipping, and replace the current maximum railway rate
scale with a cap on annual railway revenues for grain shipments. However, it is notable that port buying
is a concept promoted and described strictly with respect to executing off-shore export contracts. No
reference has been made concerning trade within North America. These proposed changes are
motivated by a desire to improve system efficiency through increased competition and accountability.*Research Associate and Professor and Director, respectively, in the Northern Plains Trade
Research Center, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, North Dakota State University,
Fargo. 
1The Estey Report is a comprehensive review of the efficiency of the transportation and
handling system for Canadian Prairie grain. The report, submitted in December 1998, identifies 15 issue
areas raised by stakeholders.
2Kroeger Report, working with industry stakeholders, has prepared recommendations on the
changes necessary to implement a reform package with release in October 1999.
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1.  Introduction
Grain handling and transportation systems (GHTSs) are among the important agricultural issues
of the Unites States - Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). The Canadian GHTS is undergoing
substantial changes based on the Estey Report1 and Kroeger Report.2 On May 10, 2000, Canadian
Transport announced the government’s intention to introduce measures to increase efficiency and cut
costs in Canada’s GHTS. The reforms are being implemented beginning August 1, 2000. It will be a
highly dynamic competitive process with important implications for marketing and commercial policies.
This study provides an overview of the GHTSs in the United States and Canada with particular
reference to grain trade between the two countries under CUSTA. Important features of the systems
are identified and described, and issues associated with current grain transportation policies and
agricultural commodity marketing are summarized and evaluated. The objectives of this study are to
provide descriptions and policy implications of institutional features and trade practices, as well as
background on recent and prospective policy changes. The likely impacts of institutional features and
policies on grains under CUSTA, especially durum, hard red spring wheat, and malting barley are
analyzed.
There are significant differences in the GHTSs between the United States and Canada. The two
countries have developed very different systems over the last several decades. In the United States,
price signals and service competition throughout the system coordinate the vertical marketing functions
and guide marketing and investment decisions. In Canada, the federal government through national
transportation legislation, the Canada Transportation Act (CTA), and the Canadian Wheat Board
(CWB), administrates the system.
The grain handling and transportation industry in the United States has been changed
dramatically over the last two decades. There have been technological changes and productivity gains in
the transportation system and substantial investment throughout the system. The system integrates a
number of services and operates in response to market and price incentives to move grain from farm to2
domestic and foreign markets (Wilson 1998 and USDA 1998). Rail, truck, and barge transportation
facilitate a highly competitive transportation market. The competitive environment in the grain handling
industry has passed enormous cost savings on to farmers and decision makers throughout the system
(Parsons and Wilson 1999). Important key elements of the U.S. GHTS are shown in Table 1 and
Figure 1. The U.S. GHTS includes storage and handling functions, car allocation and shipping, and
export handling and logistics management.
Table 1.  Structure of Grain Handling and Transportation in the U.S. GHTS
Transport Service Commentary
Farmers Moves 63 million tons of wheat.
Short truck delivery distances.
Farmer paid at delivery.
Country collection By truck and rail.
Growth of short lines.
Multiple delivery options.
Grain handling Storage of over 150 million tons.
Grain company owns elevators.
Competitive with many large farmer-owned companies.
Elevator size increased following deregulation. 
Long distance 75% by rail and 25% by truck from North Dakota.
Mode varies by destination.
Shipments to west are 96% by rail, to Great Lakes 68% by rail.
Terminal handling &
port service 
Several options including West Coast (e.g., Portland, Seattle) and Gulf (e.g., New
Orleans, Galveston), Great Lakes (Duluth).
Multiple transportation choices for farmers.
System Multiplicity of pricing options.
Sustained investment in capacity and technology.
Pricing and value programs drive efficiency.
Creates value for all system participants.
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.
 The GHTS in Canada is currently under reform. The second phase of the review has now been
completed with release of the final report of the Estey Commission in December 1998. The Kroeger
Report, released in October 1999, worked with industry stakeholders and prepared recommendations
on the changes necessary to implement a reform. On May 10, 2000, the Canadian Transport Minister,
the Minister of Natural Resources, the Minister responsible for the CWB, and the Minister of
Agriculture and Agri-Food announced the government’s intention to introduce measures to increase















Key: T=Truck     B=Barge     R=Rail     OV=Ocean Vessel
.Figure 1.  The U.S. Domestic and Export Logistics of Grain3Between 1994-95 and 1995-96 crop years, weighted average deductions from farmers for
freight increased 146, 118, and 153 percent for wheat, durum, and barley, respectively (CWB,
Statistical Tables 1998, 18).
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Price signals and service competition coordinate the vertical marketing functions and guide
marketing and investment decisions in the United States. This process occurs throughout all elements of
the U.S. GHTS. Price signals have always played an important role in fundamental storage decisions
(i.e., timing of marketing decisions are influenced by intermonth price spreads). Through competitive
pressures, price discounts have induced development of larger scale elevators and shipments, and have
provided incentives for farmers to ship longer distances. These signals and competitive pressures
influence storage decisions, the timing of shipping decisions, investment decisions in railcars and
infrastructure, and assure efficiencies (Wilson 1998).
The Canadian GHTS is an integrated system involving primary elevators, railways, terminal
elevators, and export ports, in which regulations play an important role in marketing decisions. Figure 2
and Table 2 show the Canadian grain handling and transportation logistics chain and its regulatory
framework and structure. The CWB regulates and controls grain movements from farms to export
ports and the Canadian Grain Commission regulates quality and country handling tariffs. The Canadian
government has progressively moved away from regulation and central controls to provide greater
scope for normal commercial decision making. Recently, major changes are being made to reduce the
level of regulation and subsidization and to operate in a more commercial and market-oriented
environment.
The CWB is a single-desk seller for all wheat and barley for human consumption (e.g., malting)
and export. All other grains and grain products are marketed competitively by grain companies,
cooperatives, and producers. The CWB plays a key role in getting its grain to export ports, but does
not own or operate any elevators. The CWB relies on grain companies and cooperatives to handle
grain from originations to export destinations. The overall performance of Canada’s GHTS is heavily
influenced by the CWB, which handles over 60 percent of all grain shipments. Because grains and
oilseeds are transported long distances to export points, producers are highly dependent on rail
transportation. Before August 1, 1995, policies were in place to subsidize grain transportation charges
and guarantee protection against railway non-performance. However, the Western Grain
Transportation Act (WGTA), which set freight rates along with service and infrastructure levels, was
removed in 1995, resulting in immediate doubling of freight charges paid by producers in some areas.3 
Furthermore, the removal of the WGTA also meant the removal of most restrictions on branch line
abandonment.5
Table 2.  Structure of Grain Handling and Transportation in the Canadian GHTS




80% of grain to CWB monopoly buyer with many farmers (100,000+)
who must market export wheat and barley through the Canadian Wheat
Board (CWB). Deliveries managed by the CWB through contract calls
and permit books. CWB export grains account for 84% of total Prairie
exports (22.3 million tons) with the balance in non-Board grains (4.2
million tons -16%).
Country collection Short distance
movement
Grain moved off farm by truck to country elevators. Further country
movement is by truck and by railway branch line and short line railways
to mainline train assembly points. Truck movements have been short
(10 - 20 miles) but have increased with branch line closure and grain
company economic incentives to attract grain to inland terminals.
Grain handling Increasing
competition
Handling tariffs are not regulated but monitored by the Canadian Grain
Commission, who also issues elevator operating licenses. Elevators can
only receive CWB grains for movement on the regulated system.
Three major Canadian companies that have developed from four
provincial cooperatives. (UGG, SWP, and Agricore account for 68% of
the current Prairie handling capacity). Other companies (Pioneer,
Paterson, Parrish and Heimbpcker, and other smaller, often farmer-
owned) account for the remainder of capacity. In total, there are some
1,104 country elevators. U.S. companies have become major players in
the country collection system. Cargill entered decades ago but has
been joined more recently by Archer Daniels Midland, ConAgra, and
the French company Louis Dreyfus.
Long distance Government rate
and service
regulation
Mainly by rail at statutory maximum rates based on cost estimates of
movement set in the Canada Transportation Act. Two major railways -
Canadian National Railway and Canadian Pacific Railway. Distances
moved are often in excess of 1,000 miles. Movements are mainly in the
form of mixed trains with a minority of unit trains. Trains are commonly
characterized by multiple origins in the country, multiple terminal




High levels of corporate concentration with little competition since
terminal deliveries reflect company country collection performance and
further allocation and delivery instructions from the CWB.
Port services Recently
privatized
Three major ports are Vancouver and Prince Rupert on the West Coast
and Thunder Bay at the Lakehead. Border crossings to the United
States account for 15% of the total movement. There are small
movements through Churchill. Port movements are highly regulated
through port union labor agreements that closely control working hours
and shift changes.
System Efficiency  Widely recognized as inefficient. Many bottlenecks and system
constraints including multiple origins and destinations, car allocation,
limited use of most efficient elevators and unit trains, grade mix ups,
excess tough and damp storage, impurities in grain, high demurrage.
Information Logistics information and requirements generated through committees.
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999. 6
    Farm           Country Collection         Country Elevation          Long Distance        Terminal          Port
    Production       by Truck and Rail & Storage               Movement           Elevation         Handling
    & Storage
     Widely              Short Distance                 Widely Dispersed           1,000 miles+            Cleaning          Loading
    Dispersed             Movements                         Small Scale             Mainly Rail             Grading            Vessels
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Canada Transportation Act
Statutory Freight Rates and Caps - Cost Based Rates - Branch Line Exit Controls
Canadian Wheat Board
Permit Books - Contract Calls - Elevator Collection - Car Allocation - Freight Adjustment Factors - Terminal Delivery
Canadian Grain Commission
Licensing Elevators - Country Grain Grading - Terminal Grain Grading - Licensing Tariffs - Quality Inspection
Provincial Governments
Rural Road and Highways - Provincial Railway Legislation - Road and Rail Taxation
Figure 2.  The Canadian Grain Handling and Transportation and Logistics Chain
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.
Canadian grain spends an average of 68 days in the logistics pipeline from the farmer’s bin to
port position (40 days in storage at the country elevator, 12 days in transit to the port, and 16 days in
terminal elevator storage) (Figure 3). There is considerable variation in time spent in the logistics
pipeline, particularly in the lead time from ordering cars for loading and unloading time at export ports
(WESTAC 1998, 9). Uncertainty in lead times makes planning and management difficult for all system
participants (farmers, grain companies, railways, CWB, and federal and provincial governments).
Logistical uncertainties also affect customer perceptions about the reliability of the Canadian system.
Canada’s GHTS has caused a significant disadvantage in offshore markets (McKinsey & Company
1998, 13). Logistics costs are the largest input cost for grain and are typically in the range of $60-80
per ton (WESTAC 1998) in Canada. Large volumes (around 27 million tons) are exported each year,
originating at various production points across the Prairies. The St. Lawrence Seaway route through
Thunder Bay was once the main grain export route, but growing Asian markets have currently made
Vancouver and Prince Rupert the major export ports (61 percent of bulk grains, 56 percent of bulk
































































Figure 3.  Physical Elements of Canadian Logistics System, Average Time Load of Canadian Grain, and Costs
Source:  WESTAC 1998, 9.8
Because of the long distances to ports and the export orientation of the grain industry in both
countries, GHTSs are critically important to their operations and to producer returns. The Canadian
and U.S. GHTSs are based on very different regulatory structures. In Canada, grain handling and
transportation reforms have been implemented to increase efficiency and cut costs. In the United States,
farmers and grain handlers are searching for higher grain prices, lower operating costs, and access of
U.S. grains to Canadian markets. Recently the GHTSs, on both sides of the border, have changed
rapidly to countervail the price fall from the peaks reached in the 1995/96 (U.S.) and 1996/97
(Canada) crop years. The two countries are competing with each other for domestic markets in
Canada and the United States under CUSTA and for the global market. It is important to compare the
structure, regulatory practices, reforms, and efficiency of both GHTSs because they directly affect the
competitive position of grain producers in each country. Under CUSTA, there is growing pressure to
harmonize the GHTSs and diversify delivery options.
2.  Differences in Grain Handling and Transportation Systems
Parsons and Wilson (1999) compared the GHTSs of the two countries and identified salient
differences by eight categories: regulatory structures, grain handling and marketing competitive system,
geographic scope of country competitions, grain handling, shipping and marketing practice, marketing
and handling costs, dynamic changes in the GHTS, investment in grain handling and transportation, and
prices received by farmers. In this study they are recategorized into four: regulatory structures,
geographic scope of country competitions, grain handling and marketing, and dynamic changes and
investments in the GHTSs. 
2.1.  Regulatory Structures
The U.S. GHTS has experienced extensive deregulation with many marketing and
transportation options and has been evolving toward a competitive commercial model since the 1980s.
The escalation of rail shipping options after deregulation has provided an increase in number of
shipment size and service options. With the passage of the Railway, Regulatory Reform and
Rehabilitation (4R) legislation in 1976 and the 1981 Staggers Act, the United States moved from the
micro management of railway rate through the government intervention to application of market
competitive pressures on rates and services. As the result, investment, new technologies, and
deregulation have brought substantial increases in volume of grains and decrease of railway freight rates. 
In Canada, the CWB controls the GHTS to support its export marketing monopoly. The CWB
and other government agents in the industry allocate the key physical system resources such as grain
deliveries, storage capacity, and railway cars (Table 3). All of these regulatory interventions affect
prices and performance of the Canadian GHTS. The federal government under the CTA administrates
the shipping costs subject to a price cap. In recent years a large number of operating problems have
occurred across the Canadian GHTS. To solve the problems and increase efficiency of the system, the
special grain provisions of the CTA were reviewed in 1999 and the Canadian government announced in
May 2000 its intention to introduce measures to increase efficiency and cut costs.9
Table 3.  Regulatory Structure of the Canadian GHTS
Transport Service Regulatory Authority Commentary
Farmers CWB, CTA,
Provincial Governments
The CWB controls deliveries through permit books and
contract calls. The CTA regulates prices and service
availability on branch lines. Provincial governments manage
road maintenance and construction and license trucks. Farmers
are paid 80% as initial payment by the CWB at time of delivery
(except malting barley). Balance paid some 6 to 12 months later
after final sale price has been received and all marketing,





The CTA places maximum prices on branch line rail movement.
The CWB calls grain into the system. Provinces license trucks
and construct and maintain rural road systems.
Grain handling CGC The Federal Grain Commission licenses elevators and monitors
prices, which were deregulated several years ago. Competition




CT, AAPG, CWB Regulated through statutory maximum price cap and distance
related, cost based rates. Branch line abandonment procedures
streamlined but still regulated. Car allocation through a
regulatory committee CAPG, the Car Allocation Policy Group,
involving the CWB, railways, grain companies, and producers.
Terminal handling CGC, CWB Terminal facilities licensed by the CGC. Terminal deliveries
reflect country collection performance on the basis of a
CWB/Grain Companies Agreement.
Port services Canada Port Act In transition towards privatization through the creation of
community port authorities with federally chartered local
monopolies.
System Provincial , Fiscal,
Highways, Railways,
Federal
Federal and Provincial taxes levied differentially on road and
rail taxes creating export taxes on grain movements, 15
Provinces responsible for road maintenance and upgrading.
Provinces responsible for short line railway legislation.
Federal Government also responsible for short line railway
legislation.
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.10
Regulatory structures for the GHTS that have profound influences on operations,
competitiveness, and efficiency of the two systems include:
The CWB and government agents in Canada physically allocate transportation, handling, and
marketing services while the United States allocates the economic resource through the price system.
• The Canadian structure controls the GHTS through cost-based rail price and physical
resource allocation, with the goal of equity (equal access), in contrast to objectives for
regulation that aim to create a competitive environment in the United States for a wide
variety of marketing, handling, and transportation options.
• Rigidities in the Canadian system from regulations, often entrenching past practices, in
contrast to flexibility in the U.S. GHTS to accommodate changes in the industry and new
technology.
• The CWB, excluded from the Canadian Competition Act, effectively removes the
Canadian system from federal competitive controls, in contrast to legally enforceable
commercial contracts, agreements, tariffs, and competition law in the United States.
In summary, the Canadian GHTS is an administered system in which important market price signals
have been removed and competitive pressures reduced through regulatory and administrative controls.
In contrast, the U.S. regulatory system has focused on creating a competitive environment in which
prices are used to allocate resources.
2.2.  Geographic Scope of Country Competition
A fundamental difference exists in the geographic scope of competition between the Canadian
Prairies and the Northern tier of the United States. This difference would have important implications
for the relevance of comparisons, as well as the expected post-deregulation competition. Specifically:
• the percent of farming locations within 37 miles, a reasonable trucking distance to the  two
major railways (Canadian Pacific Railway and Canadian National), are 85 percent for
Manitoba, 74 percent for Saskatchewan, and 52 percent for Alberta in Canada; and
• the average distance from elevators to elevators located on a competitor railway is 116
miles in Montana, while the comparable measures in the Prairie provinces are 21 miles for
Manitoba, 26 miles for Saskatchewan, and 43 miles for Alberta.
Thus, the basic Canadian geography in the Prairies gives more potential competition between two
railways, Canadian Pacific (CP) and Canadian National (CN), and among country elevators for grains
than in Montana. In recent years, elevator companies in Canada have increasingly offered trucking
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N. The index is a useful indicator of concentration: the larger the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the fewer the number of firms dominating the industry (Mansfield 1990). 
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2.3.  Grain Handling and Marketing
The U.S. GHTS has more intense competition than the Canadian GHTS. This competition has
led to a large number of efficiency incentives to improve service and realize operating savings. These
are widely used in the U.S. system and are little used in Canada.
A.  Grain Handling and Marketing Structure
One of the more important differences is the structure of the grain handling sector. Both Prairie
Canada and North Dakota have cooperatives that handle a large share of grains. In Canada,
companies originating as provincial pools dominate grain handling. This is also true in North Dakota
with a large number of farmer-owned cooperatives. In Montana, grain handling cooperatives co-exist
and compete with large private firms. However, grain handling services are far more concentrated in
Canada than in the United States. The largest company accounts for over half of the number of
elevators in each Prairie province compared to 8 percent in North Dakota and 22 percent in Montana.
Canada’s system is substantially more concentrated than that in the Northern tier states. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index4 indicates that levels of corporate concentration in grain handling are
almost three times as high in the Canadian Prairies as in Montana. Table 4 summarizes these key
differences in competitive structure. Regulatory and administrative practices to some degree have
reinforced the Canadian concentrated corporate structure. Increased trucking and grain company
restructuring may introduce more competition into the system.






Number of Companies 15 26 11 260 73
Corporate Concentration












Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.12
B.  Grain Handling, Shipping, and Marketing Practices
Differences in handling and marketing practices are partly a result of the structure and
regulations affecting the industries in both countries. Handling and shipping practices are
(Table 5):
• Average storage capacities of elevators in the Northern tier of the United States are over
twice as large as those in the Canadian Prairies;
• Grain storage in the U.S. system (including on-farm and off-farm, as well as at ports) is
much higher than in Canada, providing the capacity to meet surge demands;
• In the United States, about 40 percent of spring wheat shipments are shipped by unit train
(single origin/single destination), and the destination of more than 70 percent of them is the
Pacific Northwest ports. This contrasts with less than 25 percent of the shipments from
Canadian Prairie elevators at multiple car rail incentive rates. Only part of these shipments
are unit train movements. Western Canadian grain shipments are largely from multiple
origins to multiple destinations;
• Waiting times for vessels at the ports in Vancouver are three times larger than those in the
United States.
Taken together, the U.S. system has greater capacity to ship large volumes in relatively shorter periods
of time, compared to the Canadian system.
Marketing costs in the United States are substantially less than those in Canada, and have been
declining in real terms since the early 1980s. A comparison of handling costs for various functions in
each country is summarized in Table 6. It is particularly important to note that in the United States,
cleaning costs are not charged to farmers, but grain handlers offset the cleaning cost with the transport
savings and by the sale values of screenings. In Canada, grain handling services, including cleaning
costs, are charged on all CWB grains entering the system, irrespective of the extent of cleaning or
offsetting savings in marketing costs.13








GHTS Storage (millions of tons) 1998 12 163
Farm and GHTS storage capacity as % of
production (Prairie farm measured as stocks)
1997 25% 29%-53%




Share of country locations with multi car
loading facilities
1997 17% 44% (ND)
Share of grain shipped at multiple rates 1996 25% 70% (ND)
Average grain car cycle times (days) 1994 18 20 (ND)





Ratio of country storage to port storage 1997 2.6:1 13:1
Ratio of port shipment to port storage Average
(1995+1996)
13 (B.C.) 29 (Gulf)
27 (PNW)
Average vessel waiting time at port (days) 1996 12 (B.C.) 4 (Gulf)
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.
*Prairies include the Peace River District in British Columbia.
Table 6.  Handling Cost Comparisons Between Canada and The United States
Canada U.S. Canada as %
Difference from U.S.
C$/mt US$/mt C$/mt US$/mt
Country elevation 10.35 5.51 5.25 2.94 +0.97
Terminal elevation 7.69 4.04 1.84 1.10 +3.18
Cleaning 3.40 1.84 2.29 1.10 +0.48
Total 21.44 11.39 9.38 5.14 +1.29
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.14
C.  Prices Received by Farmers
The U.S. GHTS has yielded higher returns to wheat and barley farmers in North Dakota and
Montana than Saskatchewan farmers received from the Canadian system. Ultimately, the marketing
systems, inclusive of handling and shipping, serve farmers efficiently in the United States. The cumulative
effects of these systems affect prices received by farmers. Between 1984 and 1996, the prices received
by Saskatchewan farmers for CWB wheat and barley
were lower in most years than those received for comparable grains in Montana and North Dakota. In
1995 and 1996, farmers in Montana and North Dakota received from C$25/ton to C$45/ton more for
wheat and barley than similar grain farmers in Saskatchewan even though  Canada allegedly receives a
CWB marketing premium relative to U.S. grains and rail rates on grain to export ports from Montana
and North Dakota exceed those from the Prairies.
The net effect of the operating differences in the Canadian and U.S. GHTSs’ performance
reflects the respective efficiencies of the two systems. That is, price differences between the two
countries are a reflection of the combined efficiency of their respective country’s collection, handling
and cleaning, long distance rail shipping, port fobbing, marketing, and other related activities. If both the
western Canadian and U.S. GHTSs were equally efficient, then farm prices would simply reflect
differences in rail rates that favor the Canadian farmer. However, this is not the case when competitive,
regulatory, and efficiency factors are introduced in the system.
Between 1984 and 1996, an efficiency loss in the Canadian GHTS for Saskatchewan farmers
reflected the difference in the prices received by farmers. By 1995/96, the price difference grew as high
as $36.28 for Saskatchewan wheat relative to North Dakota and $45.31 for Saskatchewan barley
compared to Montana (Table 7). These differences translate to an annual average economic
Marketing & GHTS Efficiency Loss of $137 million against North Dakota's GHTS efficiency and
$147 million against Montana's GHTS efficiency (Table 8). In 1995, when the U.S. Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) was winding down, and in 1996 when it was not present and there were
widespread reports of inefficiencies and problems in the Canadian grain handling system, the
transportation efficiency loss for Saskatchewan increased to $415 million against Montana and $505
million against North Dakota.
2.4.  Dynamic Changes and Investments in the GHTS
Dynamic inter-dependent relationships throughout the U.S. system have generated efficiencies,
in contrast to a large number of logistical inefficiencies in the Canadian system. Railway regulation,
pricing, and dynamic interaction with the rest of the GHTS is found to be central to efficiency gains in
the United States. While deregulation in the United States led to price changes throughout the GHTS,
prices of the handling, rail, and port services have moved in different directions in Canada. There have
been decreases in real rail rates over time in both countries. However, their time paths have differed
substantially.15
Table 7.  Differences Between Country Prices for All Wheat and Barley, After Adjusting for





Less North Dakota Farm Price
Saskatchewan Farm Price
Less Montana Farm Price
Annual
Average
Canadian $/mt Canadian $/mt
Wheat Barley Wheat Barley
1984-1996 -9.27* - 10.29*  -7.31 * -28.57*
1992-1996 -21.26* - 15.80* -12.39* -38.10*
1995-1996 -36.28 -25.51 -26.04 -45.31
* Includes adjustment for the U.S. Export Enhancement Program.
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.
Table 8.  Estimated Annual Average Marketing Cost Inefficiencies for Saskatchewan, 1984-
1996 and 1995-1996, Compared to North Dakota and Montana  (Adjusted for the U.S. Export
Enhancement Program)
Based on North Dakota Montana
1984 - 1996 $137 million $147 million
1995 - 1996 $505 million $415 million
Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.
• In the Canadian Prairies, rail rates regulated under the WGTA, the National Transport Act
(NTA), and the CTA increased through most of the 1980s and then fell after 1993.
• In the United States, rail rates fell sharply in real terms following deregulation in 1980, and
continued to fall throughout the post deregulation period. The initial effect on rate reductions
ranges from 2 percent to 19 percent (varying across grains). By 1995, the cumulative
effects of deregulation on rail rate reductions ranges from 42 to  55 percent.
The specific process of deregulation in the United States allowed railroads to operate more
efficiently and resulted in more efficient shipping practices, thereby reducing costs and ultimately
reducing rates. The reduced rail rates were pervasive throughout the system.16
U.S. pricing structures have allowed for sustained investment in capacity and new technology,
while government investment has remained important in Canada. Critical criteria for evaluating
competition and regulation include the extent that returns are sufficient enough to induce investments.
This is important for farmers since investments in capacity enhance the ability to market grains over
shorter time periods in response to market opportunities.
• In the United States, returns to grain shipping have been sufficient to induce investments
throughout the system by the private sector. For example, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe
(BNSF) railroad averaged $2 billion (US) per year in capital expenditures and invested
nearly $500 million in their grain business in 1996 and 1997. These investments included
double tracking and siding, locomotives, and hopper cars. While other railroads'
investments vary, all have invested in expanded rolling stock over the past few years.
• In contrast, many of the investments in grain related businesses in Canada have been
associated with government interventions of various types. These have included
rehabilitating rural branch lines, port storage and handling, and federal and provincial
government hopper car purchases that today account for about 70 percent of the grain
hopper car fleet.
• Prices generated in the marketplace have provided for sufficient returns at all stages of the
system in the United States to encourage investments in response to market conditions.
Through the 1980s and 1990s private investment in the U.S. system contrasts with the
substantial public investment in the Canadian GHTS.
2.5.  Summary
This comparison of the Canadian and U.S. GHTSs found that the differences between systems
carry a large economic cost for farmers and governments. These costs were estimated for
Saskatchewan to have reached as high as one-half billion Canadian dollars annually in 1995 and 1996.
Many of the system differences would seem to contravene the spirit of Canada-U.S. cooperation and
freer continental trade. In the years ahead, there will be growing pressure to harmonize the system and
increase delivery options at lower costs and increased value for all North American farmers.
According to a study, Parsons and Wilson (1999), the Canadian and U.S. GHTSs are based
on very different regulatory structures that understandably have different effects on system efficiency. In
western Canada, the closely controlled administered market offers higher costs and lower economic
returns to farmers, but also incorporates long standing equity objectives. In the United States,
competitive regulation since the 1980s has delivered large efficiency gains throughout the GHTS that
have been reflected in higher prices for wheat and barley in North Dakota and Montana compared to
Saskatchewan. Prairie farmers and the Canadian federal government must consider closely the
advantages and disadvantages of both systems.17
3.  Canadian Transportation Mechanisms and Issues
The Canadian rail system is dominated by two rail carriers: the CN and CP. CN, formerly
owned by the federal government, was privatized in 1995. Both carriers have major lines with an east-
west configuration, facilitating shipments of grain from Prairie locations to Pacific ports (Vancouver or
Prince Rupert) or the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. The main CP lines are generally south of
the CN lines in the Prairies. Both carriers also have rail lines or hauling rights in the United States. CP,
through ownership of the former Soo Line, has lines through North Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin,
giving it direct access to major U.S. consumption points for malting barley and wheat. CN, through
ownership of the former Illinois Central, moves western Canadian and U.S. grain to ports on the Gulf of
Mexico and major U.S. consumption points. CN is also moving grain directly by rail into Mexico with
its marketing alliance with KCS (Kansas City Southern) (Canadian National Railroad 2000).
In the 1980s, a number of important grain marketing events were initiated and the federal
government changed policy toward privatization and deregulation. The stabilization program affecting
production and marketing is used for regulation and is involved with expenditure of public funds. The
CTA of 1996 made it possible for new short line railways to be formed (Baylis, Fulton, and Gray
1998). However, these are in an early stage of development and do not diminish the relative importance
of CN and CP in grain transportation. Concerns about the market power of the two main carriers have
been raised in discussions about the removal of rate caps.    
3.1.  Railroad
A.  Rail Rate
While the NTA of 1987 and the CTA of 1996 deregulated most railway movements in
Canada, western grains remained an exception. Rate caps apply for grain movements; these caps are
generally cost-based and related to distance. The Canadian agricultural industry is heavily dependent on
efficient rail service to compete in world markets. For grains, the long distances from the Prairies to
major export ports and the bulky nature of the products give rail an inherent advantage over trucking.
Although the average lengths of haul and rates for Canadian grain movement have decreased due to
abandonment of branch lines during last several years, the average length of haul and rate are very
significant factors in Canadian grain movement (Gravelines 1997). The 1998 average length of grain
haul is 958 miles and shipping cost is C$25.79 per ton (Table 9). The logistics environment has been
strongly influenced by rail rate regulation dating back a century (Crow Rate) and centralized,
government-controlled marketing. Canadian grain shippers have been treated differently than other
shippers because of long distances to markets, the bulky nature, relatively low value of the product,
absence of alternative modes of transportation such as barges in the Mississippi river system, widely
dispersed shipping points, and presence of only one serving railway at many locations.18
Table 9.  Estimated Rail Transport Costs for Canadian Western Grain
Year






1992 1,023 31.50 3.079
1993 1,046 31.04 2.967
1994 1,012 29.28 2.893
1995 992 28.24 2.849
1996 971 27.25 2.806
1997 977 26.70 2.733
1998 958 25.79 2.692
Source:  Canadian Transportation Agency, A Report on the Movement of Western Grain, 1999.
Changes in the WGTA increased rail shipping costs paid directly by shippers (previously, a
portion was paid directly by the government of Canada to the railroads). The rail freight tariff regulation,
which had governed the movement of all rail freight for more than a century, was repealed in 1988 and
now all movements in Canada, other than western grain, are based on rates established by contracts
between the railway and the shipper. Western grain was regulated under the “Crow Rates” and later
the WGTA. Since the WGTA was repealed in 1995, railway freight rates for western grain have been
regulated by tariff  freight rates governed by a rate cap (Estey 1998b, 30).
“The rate cap is the maximum rate which may be recovered by the railway for grain movements
over 25-mile blocks and is used by the railways to develop freight rates for each of the possible
origin/destination pairs on the western rail system” (Estey 1998b, 30). The rate cap applies to both
non-Board grain and Board grain on all rail lines west of Armstrong, Ontario, excluding rail lines leading
to export destinations in the United States. The British Columbia Agricultural Council has drawn
attention to the fact that while the rate cap applies to the transportation of feed grains to the export
market, it does not apply to the transportation of feed grain for Canadian domestic use.
Since the advent of the rate cap, freight rates for western grain have risen 9.3 percent as of the
1997-98 crop year. These rates fell back slightly for the 1998-99 crop year (Estey1998b, 30). Freight
rates to the western farmer are significant since transportation by rail is the largest single cost in the
production, handling, and movement of grain to export ports. For example, in recent years rail
transportation represented about 40 percent of all the costs of production, handling, and transportation
of wheat from the farm to the offshore customers’ locations (Estey 1998b, 30). 19
B.  Railcar Ownership
From 1972 to 1986, the Canadian federal government acquired 14,000 hopper cars for the
grain handling fleet in western Canada. During the same period, the CWB acquired, by purchase and
long-term lease, 4,000 hopper cars, and the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan acquired another
2,000 cars for the same purpose. These cars are provided to the two railways, CN and CP, in about
equal numbers and are used, with some exceptions, entirely for hauling grain. Since the cars are
provided to the railways without charge, the cost base of the current regulated rate scale does not
reflect any allowance for the ownership cost of these cars (Estey 1998b, 27). 
When the Canadian federal government announced in February of 1995 that the WGTA was
to be abolished, it was also announced that they intended to sell the fleet of 13,000 hopper cars that
they had acquired over the previous two decades. Producer groups have indicated that the hopper cars
should be sold to them rather than to the railways. In March 1996, it was announced that the railcars
were available for sale. Any party purchasing the cars must make appropriate operating arrangements
before the party’s bid is considered. The purchasing group would be awarded a $0.75 per ton
surcharge on grain shipments by the car fleet for an indefinite time period to help offset the cost of
owning the cars, beginning with the 1998-99 crop year (Vercammen, Fultom, and Gray 1996.).
The sale of 13,000 hopper cars owned by the government of Canada raised ownership issues
in 1998: to whom should these cars be sold in the interest of efficient transportation service? A
coalition, owned and controlled by producers, had expressed an interest in purchasing these cars.
Ownership of cars would allow producers to enter into policy discussions concerning the employment
of hopper cars. Other stakeholders have expressed their view that ownership of cars does not have
much, if any, influence on the actual operations of the car allocation system. The desire to acquire these
cars is strongest among producer groups (Estey, 1998b).
Vercammen, Fultom, and Gray (1996) stated regarding car ownership by producers:
“Producers will benefit from car ownership if, as a result of their ownership, they are able to
negotiate lower freight rates for grain movements. This scenario has important implications if the
current freight cap is abolished as a result of the 1999 review of the current legislation. The
extent to which a producer railcar coalition would be effective when bargaining with the
railways is highly uncertain.”5This section is a survey of material contained in CWB (1998) Grain Matters, Zone
Allocation, and Car Allocation 1998-99.
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C.  Railcar Allocation5
Car allocation is important because there is a transportation capacity constraint during every
crop year. Usually in a deregulated system, rates are determined by demand and supply of railcars for
grain shipments. However, in the Canadian grain transportation system, non-price mechanisms  allocate
the limited transportation services among those who demand them. Car allocation policies have
changed numerous times during the last few decades roughly as follows:
Pre-1969 Bulk allocation
1969 Block shipping
1976-77 Train run allocation
1993-94 Space cars
June 1997 20% Performance allocation
November 1997 25% Performance allocation
September 1998 Zone allocation
In September 1998, the CWB moved from a train run allocation system, based on handling
percentage and performance, to a zone allocation system. Under the new system, the CWB allocates to
a wider geographic area instead of allocating railcars to the grain companies along train tracks (CWB,
October 1998).
In November 1995, the senior executive officers of the grain industry developed a proposal to
suggest that the CWB allocate railcar orders by zone rather than the train run program. In October
1998, zone allocation replaced the previous train run allocation system. Under the old system, the
CWB allocated its share of the total car supply to grain companies along one piece of train track,
known as a train run. Under the zone allocation system, railcars are allocated to zones which are larger
geographical areas comprised of 10 to 20 train runs (Figure 4). Within theses areas, the elevator
companies, not the CWB, decide which elevators will receive railcars for loading. The CWB retains its
critical role in transportation and still ensures the right grain gets to the right place at the right time to
meet sales requirements. Zone allocation is designed to provide the opportunity for system efficiencies
resulting from direct allocations and reduced cycle times to be passed on to farmers through cost
reduction and incentives (CWB, Zone Allocation, 1998).21
Figure 4.  Canadian Railcar Allocation Zones by Railways
Source:  CWB, Car Allocation 1998-99, 1998.
In Canada, there are currently over 200 train runs. These train runs are grouped into 12 zones,
7 on CN and 5 on CP. At the same time that industry moved to zone allocation, the railways assumed
responsibility for train run programming. This function has been traditionally performed by the CWB
and involves combining all CWB and non-CWB orders into a finalized loading plan. Under railway train
run programming, grain companies negotiate weekly rail service directly with the railways for both
CWB and non-CWB grains. With this change, grain companies and the railways have greater control
of their assets and the railways take greater responsibility for directional and other efficiency
movements. Figure 5 shows a graphical representation of the car allocation process.22
*Elcos:  Elevator Companies.
Figure 5.  Canadian Railcar Allocation Process
Source:  Estey 1998b, 91.23
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3.2.   Grain Trucking
Truck rates differ between Canada and the United States. Rate comparisons are shown in
Figure 6. Canadian truck rates are higher than those in the United States for short and long hauls. In
recent years, elevators have increasingly offered trucking premiums to attract farmers who want to
offset part of the cost of transporting grain by road. Elevators, using trucking premiums, can offer
different tariff rates to different farmers for the purpose of increasing their grain volume. This is
accomplished by targeting trucking premiums to farmers in some specific parts of their market area
(Vercammen, Fultom, and Gray 1996). Farmers ship their grain by truck to specific locations to
maximize their net return. When grain companies offer competitive financial incentives to farmers to
deliver grains to specific locations, companies, local elevators, and/or terminals can change the
relationship between road and rail transportation as well as the distance over which trucks are
competitive with railways. The growth in the Alberta feeding industry creates more demand for feed
grains with truck transportation. These factors affect the competition for grain handling in Canada.
Canadian Truck Rate = 0.096818 + 0.0020613 (Miles)
            U.S. Truck Rate         = 0.0785172 + 0.0007561 (Miles)
*In 1998 the average exchange rate between the United States and Canada was US$0.68 to
  C$1.00. To convert mt into bushels for malting barley, 48 lbs/bushel is used.
Figure 6.  Truck Rates Comparison Between Canada and the United States 
Source:  Canadian truck rate:  Parsons 1998. U.S. truck rate: derived from industry sources.6See Parsons (1998, 3-4) for a more detailed discussion and a trucking cost function.
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Grain hauling farm trucks in Canada are larger than the older two axle, ten-ton farm truck. The
newer hopper trucks travel further, pull large trailers, have more axles, and carry more grain.  Many
major grain companies offer trucking premiums to attract more grains to their company.  The premiums
have ranged from C$2 per ton to as high as C$5 per ton, depending on grade, quality, and location and
market conditions at specific times of the year. Figure 7 shows trucking has a cost advantage within
112 miles against rail (before premium), and the distance can increase to 160 miles, 185 miles, and 235
miles with C$2 per ton, C$3 per ton, and C$5 per ton trucking premiums, respectively (Parsons
1998).6 
Based on Canada’s current infrastructure, approximately 85 percent of grain delivery points are
within 50 miles of a competing railway. It has been suggested that trucking premiums and a large scale
trucking program could move grain between CN and CP and even to the main east-west BNSF line
which lies just south of the U.S. border (CGC, Industry Update, August 6, 1997). Large grain
companies have the ability to truck between competing railways. Thus, the grain company may act as a
competitive intermediary between the farmer and the railway.
Trucking between elevators within a single company has become a routine activity in order to
access the multiple car loading efficiencies railways offer at some locations. Trucking is, therefore, a
part of a large number of economic activities that have direct and indirect effects on the competitive
environment. Seven forms of competitive activity related to the markets for grain handling and
transportation in the Prairies were identified by Parsons (1998, 22-3):
• grain company trucking premiums;
• access to more grain companies at delivery destinations;
• access to more railways by farmers and grain companies;
• lower railway incentive rates at high throughput locations with multiple car loading facilities;
• access to U.S. railways and grain companies by trucking across the border;
• grain company trucking between railways; and
• delivering by truck to alternative uses for export grain within the Prairies.
Opportunities for cross-border arbitrage will be heavily influenced by changes in transportation
rates.  Direct cross-border shipping has become more feasible. It is performed by trucks and rail, with
loading at handling facilities located near U.S. border points. This includes joint ventures between
Alberta Pool and General Mills at Sweetgrass, Montana and the venture between Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool and General Mills at Northgate, North Dakota. In addition, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is shifting grain trade from domestic to a transborder pattern. From 1992
to 1994, Manitoba’s southbound truck movements have increased from 390 to 543 trucks daily. The
commercial trucking sector is focusing on heavy and long haul movements almost exclusively7Tandem trailers are the largest single type of truck configuration. These vehicles are used
predominately for cross-border moves and for farm to elevator shipments. Respondents of the study by
Prentice, Kosior, and McLeod (1996) indicated that they will increase the size of this fleet by 14 units
in the next five years. The second largest group of truck configurations is the Super B Combo. These
vehicles are used for long haul (greater than 200 kilometers) and often for elevator to elevator
movements. For configurations, see Appendix 1.  
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Price per Ton
      (C$)
Miles 112 235
Truck Rate
Truck Rate with C$5 
Trucking Premium
Rail Rate
T = 3.1 + 0.066X
R = 7.5 + 0.062X
where
T = transportation cost of trucking in C$ per ton
R = transportation cost of railway in C$ per ton
X = distance of transportation in miles
Figure 7.  The Canadian Rail and Trucking Rate Functions
Source:  Parsons 1998, 3-5.
by Super B and tri-axle combinations.7 Industry structure is shifting in favor of the larger intra and extra
provincial carriers that have an adequate fleet and backhaul to incorporate grain trucking in their
operations. The commercial sector, which currently dominates the heavy and long haul market,
anticipates a drop in all distance categories under 124 miles (200 kilometers) in favor of trips over 124
miles. Commercial truckers foresee that an increasing proportion of agricultural hauls will originate at
the farmgate (Prentice, Kosior, and McLeod 1996, 38).26
3.3.  Grain Handling and Export Logistics
Canada’s GHTS was developed over the years as an administered system closely controlled
by the federal government through national transportation legislation (currently the CTA and the CWB
Act). The system consists of five main services that together move grain to export position.  These
services are country collection, country elevation, long distance transport, terminal elevation, and port
handling. Table 2 and Figure 2, in section 1, describe the relevant regulations and structural
characteristics of the industry.
Government intervention has important effects on rates and quantities in the GHTS  (Table 3).
Before the early 1990s, the Canadian grain handling industry was largely dominated by Canadian pools,
a few Canadian private firms, and Cargill which is the only major U.S. firm with Canadian handling
assets. Numerous pressures have emerged for structural change. As a result, Canadian firms and pools
are in a process of rationalization and confronting new competitors. Two major U.S. firms, ConAgra
and ADM, have entered the industry, in addition to Louis Dreyfus, a major international grain firm.
These changes will lead to greater handling capacity and efficiency, lower marginal costs, and more
intense competition for origination.
In addition to these changes, there have been notable structural changes in the Canadian grain
processing sector. First, due to growth in the Alberta feeding industry, that province has gone from
being a large feed surplus region to potentially and periodically a feed deficit region.  Barley and low
quality wheat have been shipped from Saskatchewan to Alberta to meet demand for feed in the
province. Feeds are also periodically shipped from the United States. In addition, ConAgra Grain has
announced a proposed bio-fuel additive plant to be located in Alberta. The second important change is
that several of the major grain processing firms have been acquired by U.S. firms. Canada Malt (the
largest malting company in Canada, which also owns malt plants in the United States and elsewhere)
was acquired by ConAgra Grain. In addition, several other Canadian malt plants have taken various
forms of U.S. firm ownership. Similar changes have occurred in the Canadian flour sector where ADM
Milling Company (through acquisitions of Canadian-owned plants and, subsequently, a major
acquisition of plants owned by a joint venture between MapleLeaf Foods and ConAgra Grain) has
established the domineering position (Wilson 1998).
One of the more important differences between the United States and Canada is the structure
of the grain handling sector. In general, Canada’s system is substantially more concentrated than that in
the Northern tier states. Table 4 summarizes these key differences in competitive structure. Even though
there have been some new entrants and expansions in capacity in recent years, the control of
incumbents will in fact increase in the future relative to past capacity shares. To some degree, the
Canadian concentrated corporate structure is reinforced by the regulatory and administrative practices
in the Canadian GHTS.  
 8In 1998 the average exchange rate between the United States and Canada was US$0.68 to
C$1.00. To convert mt into bushels for barley, 48 lbs/bushel is used.
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A.  Handling Costs and Cost Pooling
Marketing costs in Canada are substantially higher than those in the United States. For
comparison, costs for various functions in each country are summarized in Table 6 (Parsons and Wilson
1999).8 In the United States the cleaning costs are not charged directly to farmers. In Canada, cleaning
costs are charged on all Board grains, irrespective of whether it is cleaned or the level of dockage.
In Canada, costs of marketing Board grains are aggregated and deducted from total sale
revenue. Practically, the pooling of costs is inseparable from the pooling of sale prices. Unlike in the
United States, where values of grain adjust instantaneously to changes in sale prices and shipping costs,
the pooling mechanism masks the values (costs and prospective returns) for individual transactions.
Consequently, any costs associated with ‘inefficient’ grain movements are absorbed by Canadian
producers who sell through the CWB.
Historically, the Canadian GHTS has been shaped on the basis of the following criteria  (CWB,
August 1995):
• all farmers should have equal access to the market and the transportation system;
• all farmers should receive the same price for the same type and grade of grain; and
• all farmers should pay equal per mile rail costs regardless of where they are located or the
type of grain they ship. 
This is clearly viewed as a problem in Canada–concerns about systemic inefficiencies underlie the
controversy about whether the CWB should retain its single seller status. With losses on individual
transactions obscured through cost-averaging, it is harder to gauge the ‘fairness’ of Canadian sale
prices. (For that matter, it is hard for Canadian producers to know the value of their grain in terms of
current sale opportunities.)  If marketing costs for Board grains are inflated, the effect may be to
accentuate the gap between U.S. and Canadian producer prices, creating greater incentive for cross-
border arbitrage (Johnson 1998).  
B.  Cleaning Regulations and Practices
Commercial movements and cleaning of Prairie grains may be subject to three sets of CGC
quality standards–commercially clean, export grade determinants, and primary grade determinants.
When producers deliver grain into a primary elevator and when shippers deliver grain to terminals, the
primary grade determinants are applied to determine payment. When grain is exported (except to the
United States, where apparently primary grade standards or buyer specifications may apply),
commercially clean and export grades apply (Parsons and Wilson 1999).9Cleaning Prairie grain is an expensive proposition. For example, in the new inland facilities that
are being constructed, the capital cost for all of the associated cleaning operation equipment can range
between $1.5 and $2.0 million. In contrast, a U.S. country elevator of comparable size, which does not
need to clean to the same export standard and does not recapture grains initially cleaned out as
dockage, invests under $0.5 million in its cleaning equipment [Grain Cleaning Study Consortium
(GCSC) 1998)].
10Much of this material is summarized from a recently completed study on Canadian grain
cleaning (GCSC 1998).
11Weighted average deductions from farmers for barley freight increased more than 100
percent for all CWB grains between 1994-95 and 1995-96 crop years. For wheat, durum, and barley,
weighted average deductions from farmers for freight increased from C$12.74, C$13.32, and C$12.60
to C$31.38, C$29.10, and C$31.86, respectively (CWB, Statistical Tables, 1998).   
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Cleaning grain to the tight export standard requires very sophisticated and expensive cleaning
equipment, as well as care in handling and loading clean grain. The export standards, and the level of
cleaning required to achieve them, are unique to Canada. Two major commercial competitors of
Canada, the United States and Australia, do not clean grain as intensively. The cleaning standard for
export in Canada is intended to provide an advantage for Canadian grain in world markets.9 Grain
cleaning at port terminal elevators can be characterized as having economies of size and scope due to
their extensive investment in grain cleaning and their ability to clean all grains and oilseeds delivered.
Blending and producing more consistent composition of screenings are port advantages. As well, these
investments can be considered sunk costs. Since country cleaning operations are not designed to clean
every ton to be exported, grain cleaning capacity will continue to be required at port terminal
locations.10
Grain is cleaned for a variety of reasons, but principally to remove dockage to meet the export
standards established by the CGC. Low dockage is a major selling point of the CWB export program.
However, some non-CWB grains and some CWB shipments to the United States are not cleaned at
the export standard. One reason for cleaning at ports instead of inland is the economies of scale needed
to efficiently operate grain cleaning and reclaiming equipment. The second reason is that the freight cost
of the dockage was not significant when rail freight subsidies were in place (Kraft 1997). However,
there has been an increase in grain cleaning on the Prairies relative to cleaning grain at export terminals
where, traditionally, most grain was cleaned for export. Freight rates on moving grain to ports are no
longer subsidized and the shipper cost of moving all grain to ports has increased significantly since the
beginning of the 1995 crop year.11  Freight savings on dockage movement are an incentive to clean on12The GCSC study estimated that 66 HTPEs clean grain on the Prairies. Those 66 elevators
clean around 4.2 million tons, or 13 percent of grain delivered into the transportation system. Another
54 locations are planned to have grain cleaning equipment, which could result in an estimated 9.0 million
tons of grain cleaned inland, or 27 percent of current deliveries (GCSC 1998, 54-55).
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the Prairies. In addition, grain companies have begun to construct new high throughput Prairie elevators
(HTPE) which provide the scale of economies to clean grain down to export standards.12 
Cleaning grain on the Prairies provides a greater margin than cleaning at port terminal locations.
Table 10 shows wheat cleaning costs and returns for Canadian and U.S. elevators. There are two
fundamental reasons for greater margins on the Prairies–the freight savings to inland locations by
removing dockage and the lower cost of labor at inland locations relative to the port terminal elevators
located in Vancouver and Thunder Bay. These cost savings outweigh the economies of scale advantage
that exists with port terminal elevators’ cleaning operations (GCSC 1998).
Table 10.  Wheat or Barley Cleaning Costs and Returns for Canadian and U.S. Elevators 
Costs Country Elevator Export Elevator
Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
--------------------------------US¢/bu-------------------------------
Fixed Costs 0.5    0.42   0.5  1.0
Variable Costs
















Reclaimed wheat and feed
Screenings























Net Cleaning Margin 8.3 -1.9  7.8 -2.5 
Source:  GSSC 1998 and Scherping et al. 1992 for the United States.30
C.  Export Logistics
Canadian grains are shipped from farms to country elevators by farmer-owned trucks, with an
average cost of $5 per ton. Grains are stored in country elevators, cleaned, weighed, graded, and
eventually put into hopper cars on branch lines which are then hauled to main lines, where cars are
assembled as a unit train which is sent to an export port. The CWB, as single-desk seller of western
Canadian wheat and barley, ships over 60 percent of grain but does not own elevator facilities. It relies
on the grain companies and pools to fill orders and shares the same facilities with non-administered and
non-Board grains, such as rye, flax, oats, canola, feed wheat, and feed barley. Most storage is located
on farms and is not part of the commercial supply channel. Commercial storage at primary elevators
and export terminals is limited compared to other competitors in international grain markets (Parsons
and Wilson 1999).
The Canadian logistics system strives to operate on a ‘just-in-time’ basis. This system requires
close cooperation among buyers, suppliers, and transportation providers; reliable rail service; efficient
stock management at port terminals; and timely vessel arrivals. The smooth interaction of these factors
is critical (Denham 1997). The sale starts with chartering a vessel, usually specifying a 30-day arrival
window. For most CWB sales, the buyer (or its agent) arranges the ocean transportation (i.e., the sale
is FOB port).  For non-Board shipments, the seller (grain company) usually charters the vessel and
deals directly with the customer to tailor transportation to final destination. For both Board and non-
Board sales, the logistics process is geared toward meeting the vessel’s scheduled arrival date
(WESTAC 1998).
Problems at ports include congestion of the system. It is important to bring the right grain into
and through the system when it is needed. Clogging the system with “unneeded” grains can quickly
reduce the efficiency of port operation (Transport Canada 1999 and Wilson, Dahl, and Carlson 1998).
In the grain industry, the Canadian philosophy has been to get the grain to the ocean terminals when the
ship comes in. In many cases it is not the right grain, so a ship may have to be re-berthed an average of
3 times before it gets the 40,000 tons of grain. The current system for moving grain in western Canada
is not designed to be efficient or customer focused. After hopper cars are hauled to Vancouver, they
are often switched several times to get to the right company’s terminal. After switching, it may be found
that they still do not have the right blend of grain in the terminal for the ships that are arriving. The
average ship re-berths 3 times at a cost of $10,000 per berth, or $0.75 per ton (Denham 1997). In
1996, the average vessel waiting time at port in Vancouver was 12 days, while it was 4 days in the
U.S. Gulf (Table 5). 
4.  Rationalization and Current Policy Issues in Canada
Substantial volumes of grains are produced each year across the Canadian Prairies and
transported to numerous domestic and foreign destinations. In this environment, the GHTS is important
to maximize system efficiency, competitiveness, satisfaction, and capacity utilization for grain producers,
shippers, and carriers. To improve efficiency, rationalization of the system is underway in the Canadian
GHTS. The rationalization of primary elevators and abandonment of railroad branch lines are closely13Western Canadian grain producers need an efficient and reliable GHTS because each year
they export an average of 30 million tons of grain, valued at C$6 billion.
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related. Many high throughput elevators have been built and the number of inefficient elevators has
decreased. Rail branch lines and short lines have been abandoned as a consequence of the decreasing
number of elevators. Abandonment of rail branch lines and short lines leads to increased trucking.
Recently, Canada has moved towards deregulating its grain transportation system. On
December 21, 1998, after a one-year intensive review, the final Estey Report to the Canadian Minister
of Transport was released to the public. The final report asks one central question: What alterations,
additions, reductions, or other organic changes are required (if any) in the present administrative and
commercial regulations of the grain industry, in order to strengthen and enhance the position of Canada
in the global grain market? In the final report, every single issue is comprehensively discussed and 15
important policy implementations are recommended. 
Ending grain transportation subsidies and deregulating railways have been forcing the Canadian
GHTS to improve efficiency and to raise policy issues such as rail deregulation, trucking, and port
buying. Recommendations from the Estey Report range from policies to potential efficiency gains. Not
all are discussed here. However, there are three of particular importance to the North American grain
trade. These include the prospective effects of rail rate deregulation, trucking, and port buying.   
4.1.  Reform Package (http://www.tc.gc.ca/releases/nat/00_h034e.htm)
The GHTS in Canada is currently under reform. On May 10, 2000, Canadian Transport
announced the government’s intention to introduce measures to increase efficiency and cut costs in
Canada’s GHTS. The reforms were implemented on August 1, 2000, and include:
• the establishment of a revenue cap that provides for an annual estimated $178 million
reduction in railway revenues, which represents an estimated 18 percent reduction in grain
freight rates from 2000/2001 levels; 
• the phasing in of CWB tendering for logistical services for grain shipments through the ports
of Vancouver, Prince Rupert, Thunder Bay, and Churchill, from at least 25 percent of their
volume in 2000/2001 to a minimum of 50 percent in 2002/2003; and 
• amendments to the CTA to facilitate the transfer of branch lines to community-based short
lines and to simplify the Final Offer Arbitration process (http://www.tc.gc.ca/). 
The government of Canada is trying to create a more efficient, accountable, and competitive
GHTS that will cut costs for western Canadian grain producers.13 The decision is based on both the
Estey and Kroeger Reports confirming that changes are required in the GHTS. These changes are
designed after balancing the interests of various stakeholders and ensure that producers can deliver their
products at a reasonable cost and efficiently to port (http://www.tc.gc.ca/).32
The reform package contains six main components:
1. Replacement of the current maximum railway rate scale with a cap on annual railway
revenues from grain;
2. Funding for Prairie grain roads; 
3. Creation of a more commercial and competitive system for moving grain from country
elevators to ports, which will be achieved through the expansion of tendering for CWB
shipments to port;
4. Improvements to the Final Offer Arbitration (FOA) provisions of the CTA;
5. Improvements to the branch line rationalization process; and
6. Continuous monitoring and reporting by an independent private-sector third party to assess
the impact of these changes. 
A.  Revenue Cap and Rate Cap
Effective August 1, 2000, an annual cap on the revenues that can be earned by CN and CP
railways from grain traffic have replaced the old rate cap. The revenue cap will allow the railways more
flexibility in negotiating freight rates and service packages. The revenue cap for crop year 2000/2001 is
set at $27.00 per ton for the two railways combined. This cap represents a reduction of $5.92 per ton,
or 18 percent from the estimated effective rate of $32.92 per ton for 2000/2001, which results in an
estimated $178 million reduction in railway revenues for a typical 30-million ton annual movement. 
Under the revenue cap, railways will have flexibility to vary individual rates to reflect efficiency
and offer more innovative service. Compliance will be monitored by the Canadian Transportation
Agency, based on actual grain movements and distance hauled. Any railway earnings in excess of the
cap will be repaid with a penalty. The revenue cap will be adjusted annually to reflect inflation starting in
2001/2002. Additionally, tariff rates for single car movements originating on branch lines will not be
allowed to exceed main line tariff rates for similar movements by more than 3 percent.33
B.  Grain Roads
The Government of Canada recognizes that grain handling and transportation reforms will
increase pressures on rural roads and, in consequence, is prepared to make a contribution of $175
million over five years to help address this problem. 
C.  Grain Handling and Transportation Logistics
The CWB role in the GHTS will be modified. The CWB will operate through contractual
arrangements with the railways, grain companies, and farmers. The CWB will also have the ability to
negotiate overall car supply requirements with the railways to move the entire volume of its business to
port. However, for the portion of its business that is tendered, the CWB will contract with the grain
companies, who will in turn contract with other parties for transportation and other services. 
The CWB will tender the logistics of at least 25 percent of its wheat and barley shipments to the
ports of Vancouver, Prince Rupert, Thunder Bay, and Churchill in crop years 2000/2001 and
2001/2002, and at least 50 percent of its shipments to the four ports in crop year 2002/2003.
For non-tendered grain shipments, the industry and the CWB will determine how railcar supply
will be allocated among shippers. Should circumstances arise where the CWB feels compelled to use
its regulatory car allocation powers to fulfill its mandate, it will provide prior public notice and make
public an impact analysis of its use of the power. 
The details for implementing these new elements will be confirmed in a Memorandum of
Understanding between the Minister responsible for the CWB and the CWB prior to enforcement of
the legislative amendments.
D.  Safeguards
The government will modify existing Final Offer Arbitration (FOA) provisions contained in the
CTA as follows: 
The FOA provisions will be modified to address a long-standing complaint from the shipper
community that the process is too long and expensive. FOA will have a simultaneous offer
structure with a summary process for disputes under $750,000. 
Amendments to the Act will permit a shipper to exclude references to the proposed rates when
initially submitting a matter for FOA. After ten days, the shipper and the railway will exchange
their final offers, including rates. 
Parties involved in arbitration for freight charges which will total less than $750,000 can elect to
use a simplified FOA mechanism. In this faster process, the time between the shipper filing the34
initial submission and the final decision will not exceed 30 days. At the request of the shipper —
or for arbitration of disputes above $750,000 — the existing 60-day process will be followed. 
The establishment of a three-person panel — only if both parties agree — will provide an
opportunity for a larger panel to hear more complex disputes. 
The issue of more open access to rail lines is being referred to the upcoming review of the
CTA. Effective ways to enhance competition in the railway sector, including enhanced running rights,
regional railways, and other access concepts, will be given priority consideration. An interim report on
this issue will be given within the first six months of work.
E.  Branch Lines
Provisions for branch lines will be enhanced to further facilitate transfer of grain dependent
branch lines to community-based short lines. Measures will be put in place for railways to provide
transitional compensation of $10,000 per mile annually for three years, to affected
municipalities/counties/communities when a grain line is closed.
When a railway transfers a grain line segment, the railway will be required to operate the
remaining part of the branch line for three years. To discourage "de-marketing" of grain lines (i.e.,
purposefully deferring maintenance or lowering service levels to make the line uneconomical) the agency
will be able to: 
• order the company to improve services on the grain line; 
• grant running rights to another party; and 
• require the railway to identify the grain line for discontinuance in their three-year plan. 
F.  Monitoring
As part of its policy decision on grain handling and transportation, the government of Canada
will establish a mechanism of continuous monitoring, measurement, and reporting to provide information
to the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, the Minister responsible for the
CWB, and other interested parties on the impact of these reforms and the overall performance of the
reformed GHTS. Should any problems or opportunities for improvement be identified, the government
will be in a position to act.
This mechanism will be put in place by an independent, private sector third party who will
assess the following factors: 
• the benefits to farmers;
• whether the CWB marketing mandate is adversely affected;
• the effect on grain handling efficiency;
• the effect on railway efficiency;
• the effect on port efficiency for grain; and
• the overall performance of the GHTS. 35
4.2.  Primary Elevators and Efficiency
The number of primary elevators in the Prairies reached its maximum in the early 1960s at over
5,200; there has been a continued reduction in numbers for over 30 years. Further rationalization will
occur, with many smaller facilities replaced by high throughput elevators.  The 1,153 primary elevators
in the Prairies in 1998 will continue to fall. Although many small elevators have been abandoned, there
has been some construction of new large throughput elevators and reconstructing and expansion of
some older houses in the system (Parsons and Wilson 1999).
Efficiency in Canada’s transportation and handling system depends on the logistical integration
and the coordination of physical movements at all stages. The system strives to spread grain deliveries
and movements throughout the year to allow for regular, highly efficient, low cost train movements. In
practice, the system does not always work this way. Often there are many operating inefficiencies.
Accountability for these problems is unclear with shared responsibilities imposed through legislation and
interpreted through industry government negotiations and committees. Canadian grain handling has been
seen by nearly all system participants (farmers, grain companies, railways, CWB, and federal and
provincial government) as having a large number of system operating inefficiencies. Some of these
inefficiencies are summarized in Table 11 (Parsons and Wilson 1999, 8).
Table 11.  Some Known Inefficiencies in Western Canadian Grain Handling and
Transportation
Transport Service Inefficiency Transport Service Inefficiency
Country collection Rail Branch Line Network 
Branch Line Assembly







Multiple Origins and Destinations
Multiple Car Loading Spots
Car Allocation & Train Assembly
Insufficient Use of Unit Trains
Car Capacity Loading
Work Rules
Statutory Freight Rate Structure




















Source:  Parsons and Wilson 1999.36
4.3.  Railroad and Trucking
A.  Abandonment of Rail Branch and Short Lines
As the grain collection system moves toward a network of high throughput elevators, the
number of small country elevators decreases and branch lines and short lines that once served them are
abandoned. Closing small country elevators and abandoning branch lines and short lines cause heavy
traffic of grain trucks on highways and country road systems. Canadian railway legislation has
provisions for the abandonment of rail branch lines, as described by the Estey Report 1998a, 10:
 “The railways have, in various ways, described the future rail system as consisting of high
quality mainline and secondary mainline service. The producers and other interested parties
take the view that in order to dispose of a branch line, the railway should be required to offer it
to potential buyers as a complete branch line unit rather than breaking it up and offering the
assets on a piecemeal basis. The issue is whether the expressed desires and plans for the
railway lines that are said to be uneconomic are consistent with present legislation and the
greater national interest in establishing and maintaining a comprehensive and healthy rail
network. It is further questioned whether the interests of the producer and the community which
are served by these lines are adequately protected in the event of closure under present
legislation.”
“Some producer associations state that the entire question of closure of rail lines which serve a
captive community should be fully examined by an appropriate authority as a forerunner of
establishing standards and procedures. Some stakeholders state that a modern moratorium
should be established by Parliament pending a comprehensive study of railway lines exposed to
the disposal program of railways. Some farmers and other interested parties advocate a
contribution from the railways recognizing that the community, through its government, has
relieved the railroads of their admitted financial burden in taking over the branch line.”
When a line does not make enough profit, it is identified as a candidate for closure or transfer.
To minimize rail line abandonment or closure, which generates a negative impact on the communities
served, the CTA requires an obligation advertising the line for sale and negotiating with potential buyers.
The CTA anticipates that such negotiations are successful and the lines are transferred to short line
operators. It is recommended that the community be given the opportunity to acquire the branch lines
as a complete unit and permit the buyer to operate the line as a short line railway (Estey 1998b). 
B.  Rail Deregulation
The WGTA was ended in 1995. The federal government of Canada had investigated a review
of grain transportation and handling in 1998, which may result in further changes to the Canadian
GHTS. In 1995, the Canadian government ended the WGTA subsidy because of budget
considerations and the need to comply with the GATT/WTO agreement. The WGTA and NTA were
merged to create the CTA. The CTA marks the end of special regulatory treatment of grain and moves37
toward the deregulated environment faced by other bulk commodities. Since the CTA still contains a
number of regulations pertaining to grain movement, it is an attempt to adopt market mechanisms for
determining freight rates, while allowing some government interventions over interswitching competitive
line rates (CLRs) and FOA.
The CTA establishes a maximum rate scale annually from which the railways develop tariff rates
for the movement of western grain. The railways advocate the removal of the rate cap, leaving the
establishment of appropriate rates to the market place as is the case now in all other classes of freight.
However, there is not universal support for this view among the other stakeholders. Farmers and grain
companies are concerned that without genuine competition between railways, freight rates will become
exorbitant, thereby threatening the existence of the grain industry in the Prairies. Those who favor the
rate cap believe that it should remain in effect at least until an appropriate substitute has been
established by legislation. Under the CTA, increases in grain freight rates are still limited, but the future
of this cap is uncertain. If removal of the freight rate cap occurs, it is expected that the railways’ market
power will increase the freight rates for grain.
In Canada, farmers have little bargaining power with the railroads, as described by Estey
1998a, 13:
 “Another important issue concerning rail rates is the total absence of the farmer from the rate-
setting process. The farmer has no input in the freight rate negotiations between the railways
and the CWB, or between the railways and grain companies, for the movement of his/her grain.
Yet, those costs are borne by the farmer through deductions from his/her grain ticket. Under the
current system the farmer has no status to challenge those rates.  The issue, therefore, is what
process should be established in order to protect the interests of the farmer in ensuring that
freight rate reductions and savings are passed on to him/her.”
However, to counter this and provide an inducement, the CP proposed a repeal of the rate cap
in exchange for a guaranteed freight revenue reduction. “The effect of this proposal was modified
somewhat to assure the reduction of freight costs, en bloc, by C$6.66 million per annum for six years.
The guarantee is for annual savings to the shipper amounting to C$40 million in six years or by 2005 if
the rate cap is removed in 1999 ” (Estey 1998b, 32). Discussions with respect to the proposal took
place a few days before the final report was submitted.
C.  Trucking
Some stakeholders are concerned that branch line closures and elevator consolidations are
affecting farmers and governments. This raises the question as to whether the use of larger trucks to
haul grain greater distances from the farmer to the elevator (a) has raised the cost of trucking to the
farmer, and (b) has had a significant impact on the burden of road repair, particularly in the case of the
grid roads in western Canada. The issue also arises in paved highways installed and maintained by the
provinces which are not up to structural highway specifications (Estey 1998b).38
Major railway rationalization will occur and the number of elevators is likely to drop over the
next few years. Grain will be transferred from rail to an already overburdened road system because
thousands of kilometers of Canadian branch lines will be lost. For certain regions, it is less expensive for
producers to truck grain more than a hundred kilometers than by rail (Harrison 2000). Much of this is
due to the long winding routes to get back to the main line. Producers moving grain ever further by
truck do not face the direct cost of road maintenance and upgrading. For this reason trucks look
inexpensive compared to rail. Economic incentives for using trucks are good news for producers, but
they also have negative impacts on the road.
4.4.  Port Buying
The recent McKinsey report claims that the Canadian logistics system for Board grains is
currently under-performing relative to requirements of customers and the needs of farmers. The report
suggested that the Board could withdraw and allow grain handlers to manage the logistics system from
farm to port as agents. The coordinating role of the CWB is seen as inefficient (McKinsey 1998 and
Carter, Loyns, and Berwald 1998) and the role has been drawn into question in the recent Estey
Report with suggestions that the CWB become a port buyer.  
At the present time, the CWB has virtual control over Board grains and has some influence on
the non-Board grain system because of car allocation and other functions. A proposal has been
advanced by some stakeholders which would remove the CWB from any and all activities from
farmgate to the port of export. This would leave grain companies and railways responsible for all
operational issues; some grain companies support this proposed solution. The Western provinces
identified the role of the CWB in transportation planning as an important issue and suggested that the
future role of the CWB be driven by a goal of maximizing producer benefits (Estey 1998b).
However, the CWB has indicated the Board could not effectively function as a single-desk
marketer and provide its core service to farmers if the Board were buying at port. They have suggested
that confining the CWB to port would cost farmers more by increasing costs, increasing risk, and
reducing their ability to react to customer requirements (CWB, Efficiencies Resulting from the
CWB’s Role in Transportation, 1998, 2). As expected, there are numerous details yet to be worked
out if/when a port buying system is adopted. An important implication for U.S. grain is that all of the
focus of these deliberations has been on mechanisms to guide port buying for off-shore sales. Yet to be
defined is how such a mechanism would operate for trade within North America, including both sales
within Canada and those made to the United States. 14For example, they may expect to realize large cost savings for unit train shipments after rail
rates are deregulated. At present, the rate differentials for multiple car shipments are much smaller in
Canada than in the United States. 
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5.  Implications for Grain Trade
There has been considerable pressure for changes in Canada’s GHTS. Some industry trends,
such as the rationalization of elevators in the Prairies and investments in new high throughput facilities,
are being driven by market and competitive forces and, to some extent, by anticipated changes in the
regulatory environment. These changes may have a significant impact on cross-border grain flows.
There are also a number of proposed policy changes, including elimination of the caps on rail rates,
deregulation of car allocation, and port buying by the CWB, which may or may not take effect. In this
section, we highlight some of the important issues and indicate how they may affect grain trade and
cross-border competition.
5.1.  Changes in Grain Handling
Perhaps the biggest story in western Canadian grain handling is the rapid adoption of high
throughput interior elevators in the Prairies. The new facilities are positioned to take advantage of
anticipated deregulated rail rates.14 The rapid adoption of high throughput interior elevators reflects an
acceleration of ongoing pressures for industry rationalization. Rationalization will result in fewer but
larger elevators—similar to what has occurred in the United States. Near term, there is likely to be
excess handling capacity in the Prairies, particularly relative to export capacity on the West Coast.
Excess capacity will tend to reduce handling costs and charges, while the limited export capacity and
high throughput facilities (e.g., in cleaning and segregation) will cause more direct shipments from
interior locations to U.S. destinations.        
The new high throughput elevators will be able to assemble large volumes of grain for shipment
by unit train. Combined with procurement advantages of the Board system, this system will provide
direct grain movements from a single point of origin to various end users.  Note that this is in contrast to
the past practices of shipping grain from multiple origins via single cars to Thunder Bay for cleaning,
segregation, and reshipment to the United States. Reduced handling costs could make it somewhat
more attractive for grain to enter the Board marketing system instead of shipping to export ports. That
would be consistent with simulation results reported in Johnson (1999). In an earlier study, Johnson and
Wilson (1994) also showed that reductions in Canadian handling costs would induce larger flows of
Canadian barley into the Canadian commercial handling system and shipments to U.S. markets.     
5.2.  Reciprocal Access to Marketing Functions
Several Canadian grain marketing functions are discriminatory with respect to country of origin.
These include: 1) access to the lower regulated rail rates; 2) access to railcars, in terms of both
ownership and control (through allocation procedures); 3) CGC regulations governing inbound grain
(i.e., testing and segregation); and 4) access to the CWB marketing mechanism. In contrast, functions15These issues and legislative/regulation authority are described in Wilson and Dahl (1998).
16Appendix 2 is the application form for the State of Origin Certificate for In-Transit Grain
Shipments.
17“Karnal bunt is a fungal disease of wheat first found in the United States in March 1996, when
it was discovered in Arizona. Since then, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has also regulated limited
areas of California, New Mexico, and Texas. Although Karnal bunt does not pose a significant crop
loss threat to U.S. wheat producers, it is a disease of significance when grain moves in international
markets” (http://www.aphis.usda.gov).
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performed in the U.S. marketing system are non-discriminatory with respect to the origin of grain. In the
United States, railroads are common carriers and licensed elevators are public warehouses; as such,
they must offer the same services to all customers.15  
Reciprocal access is the issue developed recently under the December 1998 Record of
Understanding with Canada. In the near term it will be dominated by issues related to end use
certification and the cross-border trials. However, longer term, it will likely center on rail transportation.
If the rate cap is retained and U.S. growers are denied access, Canadian grain will continue to enjoy a
shipping advantage to ports. Not having the ability to ship through Canada also prevents U.S. growers
from developing countervailing market power against northern tier railroads.  
The CWB and Canadian trade authorities are sure to argue for retention of the policies and
unique regulations favoring their farmers and industries. Issues connected with grain quality   may
provide a pretext for discriminatory treatment, but the rail issue is probably much more significant. If
Canadian authorities were to allow U.S. grains to be shipped through their system at non-discriminatory
rates, they would have to: 1) eliminate the rate cap legislation; and 2) dispose of railcars and end the
favorable treatment given Canadian shippers.
A.  U.S. Grains Through Canadian Railroads
In August 1998, U.S. officials and representatives of CP requested that the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (CFIA) review their requirements regarding in-transit rail movement of grain through
western Canada. After consultation with concerned parties, the CFIA simplified handling requirements
for U.S. grain by accepting a certificate of origin16 (Appendix 3) instead of a Phytosanitary Certificate
(with declarations for freedom from dwarf bunt, flag smut, and Karnal bunt17) for grain that meets all of
the following conditions (http://www.cfia-acia.agr.ca/):41
• the grain originates in U.S. approved areas (Minnesota, Montana, and North Dakota);
• the grain will transit through Canada only by rail (in sealed hopper car);
• the grain will return to the United States; and
• the grain will not be unloaded in Canada.
On December 3, 1998, the United States and Canada entered into an agreement to resolve
longstanding agricultural trade issues including grain trade and animal trade. In-transit movement of U.S.
grain through Canadian rail, the U.S. wheat access to Canadian facilitation, Karnal bunt, and exchange
of grain trade information are major items that benefit U.S. producers in grain trade. Effective January
1, 1999, Canada has implemented the program that gives U.S. shippers and producers of U.S. wheat,
barley, oats, and rye a new option. Under the program, U.S. producers and shippers have better
transportation access to final West Coast destinations in the United States, which could result in more
competitive rail rates for grain shipments from the Northern Plains to the West Coast ports.   
Under the Record of Understanding with Canada, U.S. wheat and barley may be shipped
in-transit through Canada with a certificate of origin. Table 12 shows the amount of wheat and barley
flow through the in-transit program. The in-transit rail program reduces the need for phytosanitary
testing of the grain and permits a more timely and cost efficient shipping schedule. This program allows
U.S. shippers to ship the selected agricultural commodities to final West Coast destinations in the
United States through the Canadian rail system. According to state officials, in-transit certificates had
been issued for the movement of more than 1,580 million and 1,420 million pounds of grain  in 1999
and 2000, respectively. However, U.S. exporters and Canadian railroads would like to expand this
program to the port of Vancouver (USDA/FAS, http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/us-canada.html).






















    2,912,102
113,503,600
As of November
    1,060,000
221,792,813
Total 1,581,597,963 1,420,177,073
* For comparison purposes, in calendar 1998 in-transit from North Dakota was: wheat 82,749,000 lbs,
   barley 315,000,000 lbs, for a total of 397,745,000 lbs (180,415 tons).
Source:  Departments of Agriculture in North Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana. 42
Those who ship grain through the Canadian rail system are required to fill out an application
form (Appendix 2) for “State of Origin Certificate - In-Transit” (Appendix 3) issued by their respective
states’ agricultural department. Canadian Pacific Railway will apply “Request for Release Approval”
(Appendix 4) with the origin certificate and CP’s cargo control document (Appendix 5) to the Western
Import Service Center of CFIA. After the service center reviews the documents sent by CP, the
approval is released to CP. At the port of entry in Canada, Canadian Customs inspects the documents
and releases the railcars for in-transit movement.
According to phone interviews with elevator managers in North Dakota, there are no large
differences in rail rates from North Dakota to West Coast destinations between BNSF and CP. The
elevator managers on the BNSF and CP lines use the in-transit program because of availability of
railcars. The freight rate is consistent across the state for west bound shipments on both railroads but
differs for east bound shipments. Elevators in the western and northern parts of the state ship more of
their grain to West Coast destinations than elevators in the east or southern parts of the state. Most
elevators do not have access to both railroads so their choice of railroad is largely determined by their
locations rather than freight rates. Table 13 shows selected rail rates from North Dakota to West Coast
destinations. 
Table 13.  BNSF and CP Rail Rates for Grain Shipments from North Dakota Origins
to the U.S. West Coast Under the In-transit Program
Origin Destination
Rail Rate $/bu
Grain Type BNSF CP
Alsen, ND West Coast SWT 1.55/single
Fairdale, ND West Coast SWT 1.45/single
Fairdale, ND California Barley 0.92/single 0.92/single
Fairdale, ND West Coast Barley 0.79/single 0.79/single
Harvey, ND West Coast SWT 1.39/Unit
Linton, ND West Coast SWT 1.41/unit
Minot, ND West Coast SWT 1.60/single
Newburg, ND West Coast SWT 1.55/single
New Rockford, ND West Coast Barley 0.78/single
New Rockford, ND West Coast SWT 1.41/unit
Parshall, ND West Coast Barley 0.79/single18Montana and North Dakota growers must ensure that the wheat originates from an area that
has been officially surveyed for karnal bunt and where flag smut and dwarf bunt are not known to
occur. Information on these areas and other information may be obtained from the state departments of
agriculture in North Dakota and Montana.
19The cargo control document for WAFP will be prepared by the trucking company
transporting U.S. grain to Canada; it will be similar to Appendix 5 in style and contents.
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B.  Cross Border Grain Movement:  The Canadian Wheat Access
      Facilitation Program
Access to Canadian primary elevators is vital for U.S. producers to enhance opportunities for
grain sales to Canada. The Canadian Wheat Access Facilitation Program (WAFP 1998) is to improve
access for U.S. grain producers and other sellers to the grain handling and consumption system in
Canada. WAFP establishes rules for producers and sellers of wheat produced in eligible states in the
United States (currently Montana and North Dakota) who want to move wheat by truck directly to
western Canadian country elevators for resale or transhipment. Under the program, a seller must obtain
a phytosanitary certificate18 for his/her wheat, arrange for its sale to a participating Canadian country
elevator, and ship wheat to the Canadian border. Following completion of the normal Customs
requirements, wheat is delivered to the elevator in Canada (http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/). 
Wheat producers from approved areas in Montana and North Dakota or grain handlers of
wheat produced in those areas could benefit from WAFP. The producers and handlers can  sell and
deliver wheat directly to participating Canadian country elevators (Appendix 6) by truck for storage
and forwarding to the Canadian domestic market or export location. A producer selling his/her wheat
directly to a Canadian elevator needs to obtain a phytosanitary certificate which includes the following:
“The grain originated in an area free from TILLITIA INDICA (karnal bunt) on the basis of official
surveys, The grain is free from spores of TILLICIA INDICA (karnal bunt) on the basis of official
laboratory testing,” and “The grain originated in an area free from TILLETIA CONTROVERSA
(dwarf bunt) and UROCYSTIS AGROPYRI (flag smut).”
The Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) has issued licenses to primary elevator facilities to
handle U.S. wheat, subject to WAFP participation and adherence to the requirements. Currently, 5
grain companies have proposed a total of 27 facilities, most of which are located within 60 miles of the
U.S.-Canada border, for the program. Prospective U.S. wheat producers or other sellers negotiate
sales contracts with Canadian buyers covering price, quantity, quality, delivery, currency of payment,
and other terms. Before admitting the wheat into Canada, Canadian Customs officers will verify the
following documents: 
• Canada Customs Form B3 (Appendix 7) for the identification of goods being imported;
• a Canada Customs or commercial invoice form (Appendix 8);
• a Cargo Control Document or manifest19 in a format acceptable to Canadian Customs;20The CGC requires maintaining the integrity of Canada’s grain quality control system, (i.e.,
prevent commingling of U.S. and Canadian wheat) for Canadian licensed primary elevators handling
wheat from the United States.
21Appendix 10 is the application form for Phytosanitary Certificate for Export.
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• the CGC Importer Declaration20 (Appendix 9); and
• a copy of a USDA phytosanitary certificate21 (Appendix 11).
In addition to these required documents, there are more complicated and cumbersome
requirements that can be trade barriers in the Canadian regulation of the program, “Memorandum to the
Canadian Trade Licensed Primary Elevators Handling U.S. Wheat.” The CGC requires the importing
companies in Canada to arrange for a CGC representative to be at the elevator at the time of delivery
to monitor the unloading of the grain, to take a sample for information purposes, and to ensure that the
elevator follows the procedures and that U.S. and Canadian wheat are not commingled. The following
are CGC requirements to import U.S. wheat:
• “Primary elevator facilities are required to notify the CGC’s Prairie Region Office of the
upcoming arrival of U.S. wheat at least 24 hours in advance to ensure that a CGC
employee/designate is on site when the wheat is unloaded. Upon unload, the CGC will take
a sample for information purposes and will monitor the flow of the U.S. wheat into the
bin(s). The CGC employee/designate will seal the bin(s) to ensure that the U.S. wheat is
identity preserved..” (http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “When facilities are ready to discharge U.S. wheat, they must contact the CGC’s Prairie
Region Office, at least 24 hours in advance, to ensure that a CGC employee/designate is on
site upon discharge. When the wheat is discharged, the CGC employee/designate must
unseal the bin(s), and collect a sample for information purposes. The CGC
employee/designate will monitor the outward flow of grain to the truck or railcar.”
(http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “Upon discharge to railcars, facilities must provide the CGC s Prairie Region Office with a
list of car numbers that U.S. wheat is loaded to and indicate the destination(s). If U.S.
wheat is loaded to trucks, the CGC s Prairie Region Office must be provided with the
vehicle license number(s) of the truck and trailer, as well as the destination(s). If wheat is
shipped to another primary elevator facility, monitoring its movement into and out of the
facility as outlined above is required. If U.S. wheat is shipped to a feedlot, the wheat must
be denatured. Additional requirements apply to U.S. wheat shipped to a processing facility
or a terminal elevator.” (http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “Primary elevators must issue cash purchase tickets to U.S. producers upon receipt of U.S.
wheat. Cash purchase tickets must indicate U.S. wheat. U.S. producers will be eligible for45
security. The rules are the same as those for Canadian grain.”
(http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “If the CGC is advised of a shipment of U.S. wheat into Canada and the shipment is
misdirected and does not arrive at the designated primary elevator facility, the CGC will
contact the proper authorities and will take legal action. Any CGC expenses incurred as a
result of a "no-show" or a delayed shipment of U.S. wheat will be charged to the primary
elevator facility.” (http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “Mixing of Canadian and U.S. wheat at a primary elevator facility is prohibited, including at
the time of discharge. If U.S. wheat is cleaned at a primary elevator, U.S. screenings must
be kept separate from Canadian screenings unless destined to pellet mills or feedlots.”
(http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “Facilities are required to report receipts and shipments of U.S. wheat in the Weekly
Report of Grains at Primary Elevators which is submitted weekly to the CGC s
Statistics Unit (pursuant to Section 27 of the Canada Grain Regulations).”
(http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “Facilities will be responsible for all fumigation costs if an infestation occurs. In the event of
karnal bunt contamination, facilities will also be responsible for all cleaning and shutdown
costs.” (http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
• “Failure to Comply: Failure to comply with the requirements in this Memorandum could
result in revocation of license, prosecution, or the CGC refusing to give further permission
to facilities to receive U.S. wheat.”
(http://www.cgc.ca/views/tradenotices/uswheat99-e.htm)
The CGC costs of monitoring U.S. wheat will be covered by Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada (AAFC) and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)
during the initial stages of the Wheat Access Facilitation Program. Under this program, U.S. wheat
released by Canadian Customs at the border is considered to be "entering for consumption in Canada."
If it is later re-exported, the exporter will be required to obtain a CWB export license.
 However, the program has not enhanced wheat export to Canada because of troublesome and
particular requirements. The requirements could be regarded as trade barriers. Under the program
started in 1999, no wheat has been moved from the United States to Canada. It is necessary to remove
or revise the CGC requirements to allow grain shipments from the United States to Canada. 46
5.3.  Elimination of Rate Caps
Because of the rate cap, Canadian shipping rates to export position are now substantially less
than from comparable U.S. origins. Table 14 shows transportation rates of 5 representative origins and
6 representative export or market positions in the United States and Canada. Rates for shipping to
common U.S. destinations show less disparity. Caps only apply to grains grown in western Canada;
technically, they would not apply to grains grown in the northern United States and trucked into
Canada. The elimination of rate caps was recommended by Estey, conditional on acceptance of a
proposal by CP providing for a ‘guaranteed freight revenue reduction’ over six years. According to
CP, the prospective gains from efficiency and increased competition would allow reduction in freight
payments by shippers. (CP also proposed that rail rates be linked to grain prices, so that market risks
would be shared by both shippers and railroads.) The CP proposal surfaced in the latter stages of
Estey’s deliberations and was sufficiently radical that other parties, notably the CWB, have requested
more time, beyond the original February 1, 1999, deadline, for evaluation and debate.  The CWB has
opposed the elimination of rate caps and other Estey recommendations, such as elimination of the car
allocation policy group (CAPG). 
















Camrose, AB 30 69 120 110 91 76
Saskatoon, SK 36 54 127 95 76 83
Winnipeg, MB 60 27 150 68 49 106
Devils Lake, ND 76 49 90 74 49   n.a.
Great Falls, MT 59 77 81 103 77   n.a.
Crookston, MN 76 35 90 61 35   n.a.
Moscow, ID 26 102 n.a. 128 102 26
*  Vancouver, BC, or Portland, OR.
**Thunder Bay (Fort Frances) or Duluth/Superior.
n.a. = Not available.
Source:  Johnson and Janzen (1999).47
Effects of eliminating rate caps are the subject of much controversy in Canada. While the CP
offers assurances about lower average rates, the study by Fulton et al. (1998) projected substantial
increases in freight rates for grain, particularly in regions where only one railroad is operating. Exports
from the West Coast would fall substantially, according to their analysis.  Cross-border movements to
U.S. destinations might become even more attractive, as they did after the Crow benefit was eliminated.
However, it is far from clear how deregulation would affect rates to U.S. destinations, as these partly
depend on distributions with terminating carriers.  Thus, estimating the net impact on cross-border trade
would be quite speculative.
5.4.  Reform Package and Likely Future Paths for Canadian Rationalization
As mentioned before, the government of Canada is trying to create a more efficient,
accountable, and competitive GHTS that will cut costs for western Canadian grain producers. After
extensive consultations with both the Estey and Kroeger Reports, Canadian Transport announced the
reforms. Possible multi-level effects, created by the reform package, would enforce the grain flow from
Canada to the United States. Likely paths for modernizing the Canadian GHTS are largely based on
recommendations by both the Estey and Kroeger Reports. The recommendations would represent
major changes in the Canadian system. Among these changes, ‘port buying’ by the CWB, which would
remove the Board’s control over internal logistics and shipping, and replacement of the current
maximum railway rate scale with a cap on annual railway revenues for grain shipments will have great
effects. However, it is notable that port buying is a concept promoted and described strictly with
respect to executing off-shore export contracts. No reference has been made yet as to how this would
be implemented for trade within North America. These proposed changes are motivated by a desire to
improve system efficiency through increased competition and accountability.
6. Concluding Remarks
Grain handling and transportation systems (GHTSs) are some of the important issues of the
agricultural agenda in the Unites States - Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA). There are
significant differences in the GHTSs between the United States and Canada. The two countries have
developed very different systems over the last several decades. Recently the GHTSs in the two
countries have rapidly developed to compete for domestic markets in Canada and the United States
under CUSTA and also for global markets. It is important to compare the structure, regulatory
practices, reforms, and efficiency of both GHTSs because they directly affect the competitive position
of grain producers in each country; grain producers are highly dependent on rail transportation to move
grains long distances to export ports. Under CUSTA, there is growing pressure to harmonize the
GHTSs and diversify delivery options.
The U.S. GHTS has experienced extensive deregulation with many marketing and
transportation options and has evolved toward a commercial model within a competitive environment
framework since the 1980s. As a result, investment, new technologies, and deregulation have brought
substantial increases in the volume of grains shipped and decreases in railway freight rates. The48
Canadian GHTS is undergoing substantial changes based on the Estey Report and the Kroeger Report.
On May 10, 2000, Canadian Transport announced the government’s intention to introduce measures to
increase efficiency and cut costs in Canada’s GHTS. The reforms have been implemented beginning
August 1, 2000.
Because the grain industries in both countries face long distance hauls for both domestic and
export shipments, GHTSs are critically important to their operations and to producer returns. The
Canadian and U.S. GHTSs are based on very different regulatory structures. In Canada, grain handling
and transportation issues are very important in the agricultural industry, and the reforms have been
implemented to increase efficiency and cut costs in Canada’s GHTS. In the United States, farmers and
grain handlers are searching for higher grain prices, lower operating costs, and access of U.S. grains to
Canadian markets.
The Canadian agricultural industry is heavily dependent on reliable rail service to compete in
world markets. For grains, the long distances from the Prairies to major export ports and the bulky
nature of the products give rail an inherent advantage over trucking. Although the average length of haul
and rates for Canadian grain movement have decreased due to abandonment of branch lines during the
last several years, the average length of haul and rate are still significant factors in Canadian grain
movement. Based on Canada’s current infrastructure, approximately 85 percent of grain delivery points
are within 50 miles of a competing railway.  It suggests that trucking premiums and a large scale
trucking program could be implemented to move grain between CN and CP and even to the main east-
west BNSF line, which lies just south of the U.S. border. Large grain companies have the ability to
truck between competing railways. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allows grain
shipments from domestic to a transborder pattern.
Reciprocal access is the issue developed recently under the December 1998 Record of
Understanding with Canada. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) simplified handling
requirements for U.S. grain by accepting a certificate of origin instead of a Phytosanitary Certificate
(with declarations for freedom from dwarf bunt, flag smut, and Karnal bunt) for grain that meets all
conditions agreed between two countries. Under the program, U.S. producers and shippers have better
transportation access to final West Coast destinations in the United States. 
In North Dakota, there are no large differences in rail rates from North Dakota to West Coast
destinations between BNSF and CP (the former Soo Line Railroad). The elevator managers on the
BNSF and CP lines use the in-transit program because of availability of railcars. The freight rate is
consistent across the state for west bound shipments on both railroads but differs for east bound
shipments.
Access to Canadian primary elevators is a vital element for U.S. producers to enhance
opportunities for grain sales to Canada. The Canadian Wheat Access Facilitation Program (WAFP) is
to improve access for U.S. grain producers and other sellers to the grain handling and consumption
system in Canada. Wheat producers from approved areas in Montana and North Dakota or grain
handlers of wheat produced in those areas could benefit from WAFP. Before admitting the wheat into49
Canada, Canadian Customs officers will verify the required documents. In addition to these required
documents, there are more complicated and cumbersome requirements by CGC that can be
considered as a trade barrier. The program has restricted wheat export to Canada. Under the program
started in 1999, no wheat has moved from the United States to Canada. To enhance wheat export from
the United States to Canada, it is necessary to remove some of the CGC requirements. 
Canadian Transport announced the reforms based on both the Estey and Kroeger Reports.
Possible multi-level effects, created by the reform package, would affect the grain flow from Canada to
the United States. The most significant reforms include ‘port buying’ by the CWB, which would remove
the Board’s control over internal logistics and shipping, and replacement of the current maximum
railway rate scale with a cap on annual railway revenues for grain shipments. However, it is notable that
port buying is a concept promoted and described strictly with respect to executing off-shore export
contracts. No reference has been made yet as to how this would be implemented for trade within North
America. These proposed changes are motivated by a desire to improve system efficiency through
increased competition and accountability.50
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Appendix 1.  Manitoba Truck Types
Manitoba Truck Types





Tractor-Trailer (A Train) 7
Tractor-Trailer (Super B) 8
Source:  Prentice, Kosior, and McLeod 1996, 54.56
Appendix 2.  Application Form for the State of Origin Certificate for In-Transit Grain
                       Shipments57
Appendix 3.  State of Origin Certificate - In-Transit58
Appendix 4.  Request for Release Approval59
Appendix 5.  Cargo Control Document
DATE:
PAGE #
CANADIAN  PACIFIC  RAILWAY  CARGO  CONTROL  DOCUMENT
ACQUITTAL NUMBER: BROKERS BARCODED STICKER
***  PRELIMINARY MANIFEST  ***  PARS/INPARS PROCESSING
RAILWAY CARRIER CODE : 6105 (CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY)
ETA : 12:00
CARGO CONTROL NUMBER : 6105ES00115948000808
PREVIOUS CARGO CONTROL NUMBER :  N/A
WAYBILL NUMBER : 169876
WAYBILL DATE : 00/08/08
RAIL UNIT INITIAL AND NUMBER : SOO 00115948
CONTAINER/TRAILER INITIAL & NUMBER :
U. S. PORT OF EXIT :  NOYES MN  (03402)
LOADED OR EMPTY :  L   (LOADED)
LOCAL OR THROUGH :  T   (IN TRANSIT)
MANIFESTED FROM : EMERSON MB 0502
MANIFESTED TO : KINGSGATE BC 0818
LOCATION OF GOODS :  
ORIGIN STATION NAME : LOMA ND
DESTINATION NAME : KEYES CA
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF GOODS : N/A
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION OF GOODS : UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SHIPPER’S NAME AND ADDRESS : CHSC 
   6000 CENTRAL RD
   IGH MN 55000   US
CONSIGNEE NAME AND ADDRESS : ALGC
   4000 JEEP RD
   KEYES CA 95000 US
NOTIFYING PARTY :
NUMBER OF PACKAGES/PIECES : 1     PCS
WEIGHT/UNITS : 180000 LB
DESCRIPTION/HS CODE :
BARLEY
SHIPPERS LOAD AND COUNT : YES
SEAL NUMBERS :
HAZARDOUS GOODS INDICATOR :
CUSTOMS BROKER : UNKNOWN
Manifest status: ACTIVE           Date: 2000/08/09          Time: 18:03
* This document is reproduced based on one of real cargo control documents of Canadian Pacific
Railway.60
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Appendix 7.  Canada Customs Form B362
Appendix 8.  Canada Customs Invoice63
Appendix 9.  Canadian Grain Commission Importer Declaration64
Appendix 10.  Application Form for Phytosanitary Certificate for Export65
Appendix 11.  USDA Phytosanitary Certificate
             